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I. AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND SYSTEM
STABILIZATION ACT (ATSSSA)
T HE AIR TRANSPORTATION Safety and Systems Stabiliza-
tion Act ("ATSSSA") was passed shortly after the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The ATSSSA created the Victim Com-
pensation Fund ("Fund") to provide no-fault compensation to
victims who were injured in the attacks and to personal repre-
sentatives of victims killed in the attacks,' limited liability for the
air carriers involved,2 and an election of remedies, that is, all
claimants who file with the Fund waive the right to sue for inju-
ries resulting from the attack except for collateral benefits.' On
November 19, 2001, the ATSSSA was amended by the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act4 to extend limited liability to
aircraft manufacturers, those parties with a proprietary interest
in the World Trade Center, and the City of New York, while al-
lowing Fund claimants to sue individuals responsible for the at-
tacks notwithstanding an election to otherwise proceed under
the ATSSSA.5 The ATSSSA also confers "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" upon the Southern District of New York over all
actions "resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related air-
craft crashes of September 11, 2001.""
A. 2005 CASES
1. In re McNally v. Port Authority (In re WTC Disaster Site)
In McNally, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered
questions regarding federal court jurisdiction over claims re-
lated to respiratory injuries suffered by rescue and clean-up
workers as a result of exposure to toxins and other contaminants
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001.7 The plaintiffs originally made
claims under state law in the New York Supreme Court against
the City of New York, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, and the owner and operator of the World Trade Center.'
The defendants removed the cases to the United States District
I ATSSSA §§ 401-02, 405.
2 ATSSSA § 408(a).
" ATSSSA § 405(c) (3) (B) (i).
4 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2001).
5 ATSSSA § 202.
6 ATSSSA § 408(b) (3).
7 In reWTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2005).
8 Id.
20061
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Court for the Southern District of New York, contending that
the ATSSSA created a federal cause of action over which the
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, thus preempting the
plaintiffs' state law claims.9
Some of the plaintiffs moved to remand their cases to state
court.10 District court Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein granted re-
mand to some plaintiffs and denied remand to others. 1 Judge
Hellerstein ordered all cases in which the plaintiffs alleged that
their exposure occurred after September 29, 2001, or at loca-
tions other than the World Trade Center site, to be remanded
to state court on the ground that the district court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the actions. 12 Judge Hellerstein re-
fused to remand cases in which claimants alleged at least some
exposure at the World Trade Center site on or before Septem-
ber 29th, holding that the ATSSSA gave the federal court exclu-
sive jurisdiction over those actions.' 3 The rationale for the
September 29, 2001, demarcation was that September 29th was
the date that Mayor Rudolph Giuliani announced that the
search for survivors came to an end.' 4 From that point on, the
workers principally searched for human remains and engaged
in demolition and debris removal.
After its order was issued, the district court entered an order
certifying its decision for immediate interlocutory appeal to the
Second Circuit under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), find-
ing that its ruling as to the scope of federal jurisdiction con-
ferred by ATSSSA "involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,"
and that "immediate appeal may also materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation.' In accordance with
§ 1292(b), the defendants moved the Second Circuit for per-
mission to appeal that portion of the district court's decision
granting remands.' 6 Likewise, some of the plaintiffs, whose
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
12 Id. at 380.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 374.
15 Id. at 380-81 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2005)).
16 In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291
provides:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
108
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motions to remand had been denied sought to appeal those
denials. 17
The Second Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review the
district court's decision, remanding certain of the cases to state
court.' 8 However, the court held it had unquestionable jurisdic-
tion to review the district court's decision denying remand to
the other pending cases and affirmed the district court's deci-
sion.'1 As to those cases that were not remanded to state court,
the court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that
Congress intended ATSSSA to preempt those cases. 20 The court
held that there was no basis for the district court's reasoning
that the ATSSSA's preemptive effect differs depending on
whether the respiratory injuries were suffered at the World
Trade Center site or elsewhere, or whether those injuries were
suffered before or after midnight of September 29th. 21 There is
no language in the legislative history suggesting any basis for
that line of demarcation. Therefore, in making the federal
cause of action under the ATSSSA the "exclusive remedy for
damages arising out of the September 11 plane crashes, Con-
gress clearly expressed its intent to preempt state law remedies
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections
1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not oth-
erwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immedi-
ate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate ter-
mination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of
such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to
be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, that application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district
court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge
thereof shall so order.
17 In re WEC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d at 357.
18 Id. at 381.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 380-81.
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for damages claims arising out of these crashes. ' 22 The court
therefore affirmed the district court's order to the extent it de-
nied motions to remand to state court.
In an interesting final note, the Second Circuit provided its
opinion, in dicta, on the remanded cases while acknowledging it
had no power to review the decision to remand them. 21 In do-
ing so, the appellate court invited Judge Hellerstein to change
his mind on the issue of remand based on its analysis. 24 The
court stated as follows:
[W]e note that the district court stayed its remand orders pend-
ing appeal. Where the remand order has not been implemented
and the case has not actually been returned to the state court,
the district court has the authority, as with any interlocutory or-
der, "to revise its order at any time before the entry of final judg-
ment," Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and "to reconsider the remand to
the state court in light of this [Court's] opinion." Active Fire Sprin-
kler Corp. v. United States Postal Service, 811 F.2d 747, 758 (2d Cir.
1987). Given our view that the respiratory injury claims before
the district court are preempted by ATSSSA and are claims over
which the district court has exclusive jurisdiction, we invite the
district court, in any such actions as remain pending before it, to
reconsider so much of its decision as ordered remands to state
25icourt.
2. In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation
In this opinion issued two months after the Second Circuit's
opinion in In re WTC Disaster Site, Judge Hellerstein acknowl-
edged the Second Circuit's disagreement with his ruling that
September 29, 2001, should delineate federal and state jurisdic-
tion, and that there should be a geographical limitation to the
World Trade Center site in fixing jurisdiction. 26 Although not-
ing the Second Circuit's statement was dicta, Judge Hellerstein
nevertheless adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning, reversed
his previous order, and held that his court had jurisdiction over
all cases alleging respiratory injuries by workers at the World
Trade Center site, regardless of the date of injury.27
22 Id. at 380.
23 Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
24 Id.
25 In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d at 381.
26 In reWorld Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14705, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2005).
27 Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added).
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3. Rodriguez v. Bush
Rodriguez, a former maintenance worker at the World Trade
Center ("WTC"), was injured while assisting and rescuing per-
sons from the North Tower after American Airlines Flight 11
crashed on September 11, 2001." Rodriguez sued fifty-six gov-
ernment officials in Pennsylvania federal district court, includ-
ing the President of the United States, Dick Cheney,
Condoleeza Rice, John Ashcroft, and Colin Powell, alleging vio-
lations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act2 9 ("RICO"), the Anti-Terrorism Act"' ("ATA"), and other
criminal statutes." Plaintiff contended that, because of the de-
fendants' violations of those acts, he lost his job and suffered
personal injuries.
The defendants moved the court to dismiss the claims arguing
they were controlled by the ATSSSA. The ATSSSA provides that
"[t]he United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
actions brought for any claim . . . resulting from or relating to
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001. ''3
The court held that the plaintiff's claims clearly "result from or
relate to" the September 11 attacks.33 The court found it impor-
tant that the plaintiff was present and working at the WTC when
the planes crashed into it and was injured while trying to rescue
workers. 4 The court thus distinguished these facts from an ear-
lier decision in which it declined to construe "resulting from or
relating to" as encompassing a construction worker's claim for
personal injury occurring while cleaning up debris from the
WTC site.3 r The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument
that, because the ATA authorized the plaintiff to bring suit in
his domicile, his ATA allegation should override the limited ju-
risdictional provision in the ATSSSA.T The court held that the
ATSSSA's narrower exclusive jurisdiction provision is specific
and limited to a one-time event, while the ATA provision is
'1 Rodriguez v. Bush, 367 F. Supp. 2d 765, 766 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
2 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2005).
- 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2331-2339 (West 2005).
31 Rodnguez, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 766-67.
32 ATSSSA § 408(b) (3).
33 Rodiguez, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 768.
34 id. at 769-70.
35 See Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Stipp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
'1 RodigAuez, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 769-70.
2006]
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broader and universal in application.37 Under construction
principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court,38
the court held that the ATSSSA provision applied and did not
unduly interfere with the general rules of the ATA. The court
utilized its authority under federal law to transfer the case to the
Southern District of New York rather than dismissing the case
outright.3 9
4. Virgilio v. City of New York
In Virgilio, the Second Circuit reviewed an order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
which dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint against defendants
Motorola, Inc. ("Motorola") and the City of New York (the
"City") for allegedly providing ineffective radio transmission
communication equipment to the City's firefighters.4 ° The
plaintiffs alleged the defendants' negligent, intentional, and
fraudulent actions proximately caused the decedents' deaths.41
The defendants moved to dismiss the claims on the ground that
the plaintiffs waived any rights to sue the City or Motorola based
on their election to take part in the Victim Compensation
Fund.4 2 The plaintiffs argued that the waiver provision of the
ATSSSA only bars suits against the airline industry.43 The court
disagreed, holding that the waiver provision in the statute is un-
ambiguous and also applies to claims against non-airline defend-
ants.44 The ATSSSA provides as follows:
(B) Limitation on Civil Action.
(i) In general. Upon the submission of a claim under this
title, the claimant waives the right to file a civil action (or to
be a party to an action) in any Federal or State court for
damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001. The preceding sentence
does not apply to a civil action to recover collateral source
obligations, or to a civil action against any person who is a
37 Id. at 771.
38 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Pure Oil
Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
39 Rodriguez, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 773.
40 Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2005).
41 Id. at 108-09.
42 Id. at 110-11.
43 Id. at 112.
- Id. at 117-18.
112
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
knowing participant in any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft
or commit any terrorist act.
4 5
The court held the plaintiffs' claims were within the scope of
the waiver provision and found that their damages arose "as a
result of" the terrorist-related attacks.4" The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that, even if the waiver applied, it only ap-
plied to compensatory damages and not to the plaintiffs' claims
against the defendants for punitive damages.4 7 The court held
that, while punitive damages were not curative in nature, they
could not be recovered under New York law without some com-
pensatory injury.4 8 Since the plaintiffs' claims for compensatory
damages were barred, the possibility of a punitive award was like-
wise relinquished.
II. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
The Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA") preempts state based
claims if they relate to price, route, or service of an air carrier."
The ADA states:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivi-
sion of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier that may provide air transportation under this
subpart.5"
Several Supreme Court cases have interpreted the scope of pre-
emption under the ADA. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
the Court determined that claims involving advertising by air-
lines were preempted by the ADA because advertising, under
the broad "related to" language of the statute, is connected with
price, route, or service of air carriers. 5 1 In American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens, the Court addressed whether breach of contract
claims against air carriers were preempted by the ADA.52 The
Court held that, while the ADA preempted a claim under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, routine breach of contract claims
under state law were not preempted because the ADA does not
45 ATSSSA § 405(c) (3) (B).
46 Virgilio, 407 F.3d at 114.
47 Id. at 116-18.
48 Id. at 117-18.
49 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713 (West 2005).
50 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West 2005).
51 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
52 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
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shelter airlines from suits "seeking recovery solely for the air-
line's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings."53
In 2005, courts rendered ADA decisions involving consumer
protection statutes, contract claims, privacy claims, tort claims,
whistleblower acts, and deep vein thrombosis claims.54
A. CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
1. Brownstein v. American Airlines
Plaintiffs had purchased tickets on an American Airlines, Inc.
("American") flight but were unable to sit in their reserved seats
due to an overweight passenger who occupied a portion of one
of their seats and who refused to lower the armrest.55 After the
man moved to another row and the plaintiffs took their seats,
they were escorted off the aircraft by an American gate agent
who then called the police and had the plaintiffs escorted from
the terminal.56 This same gate agent would not permit the
plaintiffs to rebook their flight, but they were accommodated by
another American employee who placed them on a flight to a
different, but nearby, destination airport.57 Plaintiffs sued for
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, defamation, breach of contract, and violation of
the California Unfair Competition Law.58 Plaintiffs also sought
remedies under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act."9
American moved to dismiss all six claims, alleging that plaintiffs
had failed to state a claim for the alleged negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and
breach of contract claims and that the fifth and sixth counts,
which alleged violations of the two California consumer acts,
were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"). 6"
As to the tort claims, the court dismissed the false imprison-
ment claim but denied defendant's motion as to the negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of
53 Id. at 228.
54 See infra Section III and accompanying text on Deep Vein Thrombosis
claims.
55 Brownstein v. Am. Airlines, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30295, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 7, 2005).
56 Id.
57 Id. at *3.
58 Id. at *4-5.
59 Id. at *5.
60 Id. at *5-7.
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contract claims."' The court based these rulings on whether the
claims were properly pled and whether the facts created ajury
question, not on whether they were preempted by the ADA.12
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims under the California
consumer protection statutes were preempted by the ADA."'
The court cited the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
American Airlines v. Wolens as persuasive."4 In Wolens, the Court
found that the plaintiffs' challenge to the airline's retroactive
changes to its frequent flyer program, which limited availability
of seats, was preempted by the ADA because the consumer pro-
tection laws attempted "'to guide and police the marketing
practices' of the airline, in direct contravention of the purpose
of the ADA."' 65 Here, the court found that the plaintiffs' com-
plaints about the overweight passenger's occupation of their
seat related to the prices charged by American, since it impli-
cated the amount of space allocated by the airline to each pas-
senger, and that their complaint about American's removal
procedures related to its services." Because the ADA preempts
claims related to price, route, or service, the court dismissed
these two claims.
B. CONTRACT CLAIMS
1. Samtech Corp. v. Federal Express Corp.
In Samtech, a Texas federal district court addressed whether
the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA") preempted a Texas law
which prohibited the enforcement of a contractually imposed
statute of limitations period of less than two years."' The plain-
tiff, Samtech Corporation ("Samtech"), shipped a package via
Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") and sued two years
later, alleging that FedEx damaged the shipment, although the
contract of carriage required a suit to be brought within one
year of shipment."8 The court granted FedEx's motion for sum-
maryjudgment in part and found that Samtech's claims for bail-
- Id. at *9-11.
1(1 d. at *10-11.
- Id. at *11.
64 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
65 Brownstein, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30295 at *16 (quoting 0Voens, 513 U.S. at
228).
-1 Id. at *18-19.
137 Santech Corp. v. Fed. Express Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27132, at *1-2
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2004).
-' Id. at * 1.
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ment and negligence were preempted by the ADA, leaving only
Samtech's breach of contract claim against FedEx.69 The court
initially agreed with Samtech that the Texas law applied and al-
lowed the breach of contract claim to proceed.7 ° However,
upon reconsideration, it held that the ADA preempted the
Texas law and found that the one year limitation was enforcea-
ble.71 Samtech then moved for reconsideration of the court's
last decision. 2
The court affirmed its last decision and found that the Texas
law, which makes contractually agreed to limitation provisions of
less than two years unenforceable, was preempted by the ADA
and that the one-year limitation period in FedEx's contract was
reasonable. 7 The court declined to borrow the Texas statute of
limitations because, "while federal courts generally borrow state
statutes of limitation if federal law does not supply a limitations
period, such borrowing is not necessary when the parties have
contracted for a limitations period."74 Samtech made several ar-
guments against preemption, including arguing that the Texas
law was a procedural tolling statute that did not affect the par-
ties' substantive rights. 75 The court upheld its earlier ruling that
the ADA "does not permit the application of state law to expand
or enlarge parties' contractual obligations by external require-
ments, such as requiring parties to allow suit after their contrac-
tually agreed period for filing has expired."76
2. Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group, Inc.
In Monzingo, the plaintiff filed suit against Alaska Air Group
Inc. and Alaska Airlines, Inc. ("Alaska Airlines") after the airline
made changes to its frequent flyer program which affected
Monzingo's use of previously accumulated miles.77 The trial
court granted Alaska Airlines' motion for summary judgment,
finding that while Monzingo's breach of contract claim was not
preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), the con-
69 The details of the court's decision as to preemption by the ADA are con-
tained in the court's unpublished decisions of March 14, 2005, and May 28, 2005.
Id. at *2.
70 Id. at *3.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at *9.
74 Id. at *5.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *9.
77 Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group, Inc., 112 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2005).
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tract between the parties and their course of dealing indicated
the intent to allow changes to the program, with reasonable no-
tice.78 The trial court also awarded the defendants $36,877.15
in attorney's fees under Alaska law.7 9
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determi-
nation that, while the breach of contract action was not pre-
empted by the ADA, there was no breach by defendants.8" The
court concluded that American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens and subse-
quent cases have held that
contract actions seeking invalidation of express contract terms,
enforcement of equitable remedies, or punitive damages are pre-
empted, because they would "impermissibly enlarge the scope of
the proceedings beyond the parties' agreement." But if the par-
ties "seek to enforce a term implied in fact in the agreement
based upon the parties' reasonable expectations," no preemp-
tion problem is presented. 1
Here, because it was within Monzingo's reasonable expecta-
tions, based upon the language of the contract, that Alaska Air-
lines could modify the program with adequate notice, no breach
of contract occurred.82 However, the court did reverse the trial
court's award of attorney's fees.83
3. Koutsouradis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
In Koutsouradis, a female passenger on a Delta Air Lines, Inc.
("Delta") flight between Las Vegas and Tampa with a layover in
Dallas sued the airline in federal court after she was allegedly
subjected to sexually offensive comments by Delta employees.84
During the layover in Dallas, Koutsouradis was asked to accom-
pany the gate agent to the tarmac because her checked baggage
was vibrating.85 She told the gate agent that the vibration was
probably due to her vibrator and proceeded to retrieve it and
78 Id. at 659-60.
79 Id. at 658.
80 Id. at 668. The Supreme Court of Alaska hears appeals directly from the
Alaska trial courts. The Alaska Court of Appeals only hears appeals in certain
criminal cases. Alaska Court System, About the Alaska Court System, http://
www.state.ak.us/courts/ctinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
"I Monzingo, 112 P.3d at 660 (quoting Waul v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2003 WL
22719273, at *3 (Cal. App. Nov. 17, 2003)).
82 Id. at 618.
83 Id.
84 Koutsouradis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 427 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 2005).
85 Id.
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turn it off.86 She claimed that the Delta employees made lewd
comments and laughed at her while she was forced to remove
the vibrator from her bag in front of the employees and other
passengers."7 She sued Delta for negligence, negligent and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,
gender discrimination, and breach of contract of carriage. 8
Prior to trial the district court judge dismissed all claims except
for the breach of contract of carriage claim." During the trial,
the court found that the breach of contract claim was pre-
empted by the ADA and granted Delta's motion forjudgment as
a matter of law.9 0
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision.91 The court found that the district court was
correct in allowing the breach of contract claim to go to trial
because "[t] he ADA preemption clause does not shelter airlines
from suits which allege no violation of state-imposed obligations,
but seek only to recover for the airline's alleged breach of its
own, self-imposed undertakings. "92 However, the evidence at
trial presented by Koutsouradis revealed that her breach of con-
tract claim related to the service provided to her by Delta, under
the definition of "service" established by the Fifth Circuit in
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc."5 The court noted the following:
Koutsouradis' bag was vibrating. The situation needed to be ad-
dressed from a security standpoint. Baggage handling, passenger
handling and courteousness relate to the heart of services that an
airline provides. These services are inherent when you board an
airplane. The basis of her claim was personal rudeness, wonton
[sic] interference and lack of good treatment. If a passenger is
unhappy with the way his or her baggage is handled, or the way
he or she are [sic] treated, such individual is free never to fly that
airline again.94
Because the allegations arose from Delta's service and not from
a "self-imposed undertaking" by Delta, Koutsouradis' claims
were preempted by the ADA.9 5 The court also affirmed the dis-
86 Id at 1342.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1341.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1343.
43 Id. at 1344.
94 Id. at 1344 n.2.
95 Id. at 1343-44.
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trict court's denial of punitive damages and dismissal of plain-
tiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.9'-
4. O'Callaghan v. AMR Corp.
In O'Callaghan, the plaintiffs' suit in an Illinois federal district
court against American Airlines, Inc. ("American Airlines") and
its parent company, AMR Corp. ("AMR"), arose out of advertis-
ing by American Airlines stating that it offered more legroom
than other airlines."7 Plaintiffs alleged that the advertisement
induced their purchase of tickets and sued on four counts-
breach of contract, common law fraud, violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act, and a
class action claim."8
The district court first addressed the fraud claims under com-
mon law and Illinois state law and found that both claims were
preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.") Because Ameri-
can Airlines' advertising related to both its rate and service,
plaintiffs' claims were preempted."' The court rejected the de-
fendants' arguments that plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
failed to state a claim, because the jury could find that the plain-
tiffs' offer to purchase American Airlines' tickets was subject to
the terms of American Airlines' advertisement.""1 Because the
court found that the breach of contract claim was proper, it de-
nied defendants' motion to dismiss the class action claim. 10 2
However, the court did grant AMR's motion to dismiss the plain-
tiffs' claims against it because, in general, a parent company is
not liable for the acts of its subsidiary, and plaintiffs had
presented no evidence to persuade the court to pierce the cor-
porate veil.""
5. Power Standards Lab, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.
In Power Standards, the plaintiff, Power Standards Lab, Inc.
("Power Standards"), sued after defendant Federal Express Cor-
poration ("FedEx") failed to pay for damages caused during
Id. at 1344-45.




1oo Id. at *4.
Il Id. at *6-7.
102 Id. at *7.
[l)" Id. at *8-9.
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shipment." 4 Power Systems had paid for $20,000 of additional
"declared value" coverage, but when it submitted a claim for
$17,450 in repair costs, FedEx refused to pay.1 1 5 After Power
Systems had incurred over $78,000 in attorney's fees, and just six
weeks prior to trial, FedEx sent it a check for $18,409.45 as a
refund of the repair costs and the $959.45 initially paid to ship
the goods.1"6 Power Systems proceeded to trial, arguing that it
was entitled to the attorney's fees due to FedEx's breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 0 7 At trial, the
jury awarded Power Systems $78,027.08 in attorney's fees and
punitive damages of $1.5 million.10 After Power Systems agreed
to a reduced punitive damages award of $600,000, FedEx
appealed.109
FedEx argued on appeal that the California laws under which
Power Systems sought relief, for Brandt damages"' and punitive
damages, were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act
("ADA") since the lawsuit arose out of the service it provided to
Power Systems, and the damages were limited to the declared
value of the shipment.1 1 In addition, FedEx argued that the
federal common law "released value" doctrine also limited
Power Systems' recovery to the declared value. 1 2 The appeals
court agreed with both arguments. 1 3
Under the ADA, the appeals court found both that FedEx
qualified as an air carrier and that the dispute arose out of the
service provided by FedEx through its shipping contract with
Power Systems.1 14 The court rejected Power Systems' argument
that the dispute instead arose out of FedEx's handling of the
claim after shipment.'15 Because the ADA was applicable, it pre-
empted Power Systems' claims for Brandt damages (attorney
104 Power Standards Lab, Inc., v. Fed. Express Corp., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1039
(West 2005).
105 Id. at 1041-42.




110 Brandt damages are attorney's fees awarded in California insurance cases
where the insured must retain counsel in order to obtain benefits under its policy
with the insurer. Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813 (1985).
111 Power Standards Lab, Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th at 1042.
112 Id. at 1050.
113 Id. at 1051.
114 Id. at 1044-45.
115 Id. at 1048.
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fees) and punitive damages." 6 The appeals court found that
both of these awards arose out of California state laws, and fur-
ther commented that Brandt damages were only applicable in
insurance cases.117 It also found that Power Systems' recovery
was limited by the contract of carriage between it and FedEx,
and the contract did not mention either Brandt damages or pu-
nitive damages.' 18 As for Power Systems' argument that the dis-
pute arose out of claim handling rather than out of the service
provided by FedEx, the court found that "the law of federal pre-
emption does not allow such a distinction."' 19 Because the
claim ultimately arose out of the movement of Power Systems'
goods by FedEx, the ADA preempted all of Power Systems' state
law claims.12 0 In addition, the court held that the federal com-
mon law "declared value" or "released value" doctrine also lim-
ited Power Systems' recovery to its declared value of $20,000 for
the shipment.' 2 1
C. PRIVACY LITIGATION
1. In reJetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigation
After September 11, 2001, the government and airlines be-
came more concerned about airline safety; in response to these
concerns, the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA")
sent a written request to JetBlue Airways Corporation ('Jet-
Blue") asking it to supply its Passenger Name Records ("PNRs")
to Torch Concepts, Inc. ("Torch"), a government subcontrac-
tor. 122 After JetBlue provided the requested data, passengers
sued JetBlue, Torch, and other data companies in a class action
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York.' 23 The plaintiffs alleged that the defend-
ants violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986124 ("ECPA"), violated New York consumer protection stat-
utes, committed trespass to property, and were unjustly en-
116 Id. at 1049.
117 Id. at 1046.
118 Id. at 1049.
119 Id. at 1048.
120 Id. at 1049.
121 Id. at 1050.
122 In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 304-05
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
123 Id. at 305.
124 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2712 (West 2005).
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riched. 125 In addition, JetBlue was sued individually for breach
of contract.126 All defendants filed 12 (b) (6) motions to dismiss,
alleging that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim either
under the ECPA or under state law.1 27 Defendants alleged that
plaintiffs' state law claims were expressly preempted by the Air-
line Deregulation Act ("ADA"), or alternatively, that the state
law claims were impliedly preempted by the federal govern-
ment's occupation of the field of aviation safety. 128
The court, relying on other cases interpreting the ECPA, in-
cluding In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation,129 found thatJet-
Blue's website did not qualify it as an electronic communication
service provider or remote computing service. 3 ° Because there
was no claim under the ECPA against JetBlue, the aiding and
abetting claims against the other defendants failed as well.13 1
As to the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' state law
claims were expressly preempted, the court found that while the
ADA preempted the claims under the New York consumer pro-
tection statutes, the plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, tres-
pass to property, and unjust enrichment were not expressly
preempted. 11 2 Under the holdings of Morales v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.1 33 and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,13 1 the breach of
contract claim against JetBlue was not preempted, because "the
application of state law to honor private bargains does not
threaten to undermine federal deregulation in the same way
that enforcement of state public policy would. ' 135 In addition,
the court held that the plaintiffs' claims for trespass to property
and unjust enrichment did not implicate "service" under the
ADA and thus were not preempted. 1 6
As for the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' claims
were impliedly preempted because the federal government oc-
cupies the field of aviation safety, the court found that a ques-




1-9 In re Nw. Airlines Corp. Privacy Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10580 (D.
Minn. June 6, 2004).
130 In reJetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 309-10.
131 Id. at 310.
132 Id. at 318-20.
133 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
134 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
135 In reJetblue Airway Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
136 Id. at 319-20.
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tion of fact remained as to whether the defendants' actions
arose out of aviation safety. 37 Therefore, the breach of con-
tract, trespass to property, and unjust enrichment claims were
not preempted by either express preemption under the ADA
nor by implied preemption in the field of aviation security.'
Even though the court found that these claims by the plain-
tiffs' were not preempted, it ultimately held that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under state or common law.' 39 Plaintiffs
were unable to show how they were damaged by JetBlue's al-
leged breach of contract, how they were injured by the alleged
trespass to property, or why JetBlue should be required to pay
restitution for its alleged unjust enrichment. 140  Therefore,
while the claims survived the preemption challenge, the court
ultimately granted the defendants' 12(b) (6) motions.
2. In re American Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litigation
In privacy litigation against American Airlines, Inc. ("Ameri-
can Airlines"), passengers sued American Airlines, AMR Corp.,
Airline Automation, Inc. ("AAI") and various other companies
that received passenger information collected by American Air-
lines through its website.' 41 The various lawsuits sought dam-
ages from defendants for violations of the ECPA and for state
law claims for breach of contract, trespass to property, invasion
of privacy, unjust enrichment, and deceptive trade practices. 14 2
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ECPA and either that
the state law claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation
Act ("ADA") or, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs failed to
state a claim under state law.'43
The court determined that AAI and American Airlines did
not violate the ECPA under either § 2701, which prohibits unau-
137 The court stated that, although the state laws at issue were not specifically
applicable to aviation security, "the Supreme Court has recognized that field pre-
emption analysis may be understood as a species of conflict preemption, which
exists where a state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. at 320 (quoting English
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1941)).
-, Id. at 316.
139 Id. at 320.
'40 Id. at 327-30.
141 In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (N.D. Tex.
2005).
142 Id. at 554.
143 Id. at 556-57.
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thorized access to a facility through which electronic communi-
cation service is provided, or § 2702, which prohibits an
electronic communication service from knowingly divulging
stored contents. 14 4 As to § 2701, the court determined, based
upon plaintiffs' pleadings, that while AAI might have made an
unauthorized disclosure of American Airlines' data, it did not
do so through unauthorized access to an American Airlines' fa-
cility.1 45 Further, American Airlines did not violate § 2702, a
criminal statute, even if it breached its privacy contract with
plaintiffs.1 46 Therefore, the court granted the defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss the plaintiffs' ECPA claims.' 47
The court also determined that all of the plaintiffs' state law
tort claims for trespass to property, invasion of privacy, decep-
tive trade practices, and unjust enrichment were preempted by
the ADA, because of their relation to American Airlines' ser-
vice. 148 The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's definition of
"services" from Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. which stated the
following:
"Services" generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated pro-
vision of labor from one party to another. If the element of bar-
gain or agreement is incorporated in our understanding of
services, it leads to a concern with the contractual arrangement
between the airline and the user of the service. Elements of the
air carrier service bargain include items such as ticketing, board-
ing procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage han-
dling, in addition to the transportation itself. These matters are
all appurtenant and necessarily included with the contract of car-
riage between the passenger or shipper and the airline. It is these
[contractual] features of air transportation that we believe Con-
gress intended to de-regulate as "services" and broadly to protect
from state regulation.' 49
While each of these claims, which touched some aspect of
American Airlines' services, was preempted by the ADA, the
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim against American Airlines
was not expressly preempted because the ADA does not pre-
empt recovery for air carriers' violations of self-imposed under-
-" Id. at 554-61 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2702 (West 2005)).
145 Id. at 554.
146 Id. at 560.
147 Id. at 561.
-4 Id. at 563.
149 Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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takings. 1 1' However, the court determined that the plaintiffs
ultimately had failed to state a claim under this cause of action
and granted American Airlines' motion to dismiss the breach of
contract claim.' 5 ' The court granted the plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint in light of the court's ruling. 5 2
D. TORT CLAIMS
1. Denzik v. Regional Airport Authority of Louisville &Jefferson
County
In Denzik, a property owner sued the Louisville Regional Air-
port Authority ("Authority") in Kentucky state court for issues
related to airplane flights over his home. 5 The Authority re-
moved the action to federal court on the grounds that the Air-
line Deregulation Act ("ADA") completely preempted Denzik's
state law claims for trespass, nuisance, invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.'54 Denzik then
sought to remand the case to state court. 155
The district court found that, although the ADA might pre-
empt some of Denzik's claims, the case was improperly removed
to federal court, because the Authority claimed that the ADA
completely preempted Denzik's claims.' 56 The court found the
holding in Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp. 57 to be
persuasive. 15  In Musson, the Sixth Circuit held that the ADA
did not "completely" preempt state law claims in lawsuits against
air carriers. 151 Unlike other statutes, "the ADA is simply not one
of those extraordinary circumstances where Congress intends, not
merely to preempt a certain amount of state law, but also to
transfer jurisdiction to decide the preemption question from
state to federal courts."'16 Because the claims were not com-
pletely preempted by the ADA, Denzik's claims were state law
claims requiring adjudication in state court.'61 The court did
IVro In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
51 Id. at 567.
152 Id. at 568.
153 Denzik v. Reg'l Airport Auth. of Louisville &Jefferson County, 361 F. Supp.




157 Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244 (6th Cir. 1996).
158 Denzik, 361 F. Supp. at 663.
159 Musson, 89 F.3d at 1244.
16o Denzik, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
161 Id.
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note, however, that the state court would be required to analyze
the claims to determine whether any of them were preempted
by the ADA.1 1
2
2. Henson v. Southwest Airlines Co.
The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") brought an ac-
tion against appellant, Desmond T. Henson, after his checked
baggage was searched, and an unloaded handgun was discov-
ered. 16' After the FAA dropped the charges, Henson sued
Southwest Airlines Company ("Southwest") for malicious prose-
cution and negligence, alleging that he was "profiled" by a
Southwest ticket agent as a potential drug courier, which
prompted the search of his baggage. 164 The trial court granted
summary judgment to Southwest on the ground that Henson's
claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act
("ADA"), and Henson appealed.1 65
The court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court
decisions involving ADA preemption in Morales v. Trans, World
Air Lines16 6 and in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens'67 but ap-
peared to base its decision on a Texas Supreme Court case, Con-
tinental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer.' 6 In Keifer, the court applied a two-
part test to determine whether state tort actions against airlines
were preempted by the ADA.' 69 "First, it asked whether the
claims related to airline rates, routes or services. Second, the
court determined whether the claims constituted the enactment
or enforcement of a state law, rule, regulation, standard, or
other provision. '"170 Applying the Keifer test, the court answered
the first part in the affirmative and determined that Henson's
claims arose out of the service provided by Southwest. 7 ' South-
west employees were notified by a computer-assisted passenger
screening system that alerted them as to which passengers re-
quired further screening. 172 The "Southwest employees have no
discretion in determining which passengers are subject to addi-
162 Id.
163 Henson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 180 S.W.3d 841, 842 (West 2005).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Morales v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
167 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
168 Henson, 180 S.W.3d at 846-47.
169 Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 281 (Tex. 1996).
170 Henson, 180 S.W.3d at 845.




tional security screening" and "the ticketing agent's actions were
based on mandatory federal aviation security screening regula-
tions directly affecting airline services through ticketing and
baggage-handling procedures.' 171 In applying the second part
of the test, the court found that "allowing state courts to adjudi-
cate tort law claims arising out of an airline's use of federally
mandated security screening procedures has the potential for
undermining the federal regulatory scheme and subjecting air-
lines to inconsistent multi-state litigation." '74 Therefore, the
court upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment to
Southwest based on the preemption of Henson's claims by the
ADA. 175
3. Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines
On March 25, 2000, the plaintiff, an Iranian born physician,
was denied boarding at Dulles Airport in Washington, D.C. and
was led away by airport police after he and a Lufthansa German
Airlines' ("Lufthansa") employee were involved in a dispute re-
garding the search of his baggage.' 76 The plaintiff claimed the
agent told him that he was subject to a search prior to boarding
simply because he carried an Iranian passport and because he
posed a security threat to the flight and to the other passen-
gers. 7 7 The ticket agent told the plaintiff that she was acting
pursuant to "top-secret United States government regulations"
and refused to provide a copy of the regulations upon plaintiffs
request.' 7' After the plaintiff was arrested, the Lufthansa man-
ager on duty sent the local magistrate a written statement, indi-
cating the intent to press charges against plaintiff for criminal
trespass. 7' The plaintiff eventually traveled to Germany and,
upon his return, approached the Lufthansa counter to request a
copy of the written report, at which time the same ticket agent
called the police, alleging that plaintiff was "threatening" her.""1
The plaintiff pled not guilty, and all charges were eventually
dropped.'' The plaintiff then sued Lufthansa and its two
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 847.
176 Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 402 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D.D.C.
2005).
177 Id. at 134.
178 Id.
173 Id.
18(1 Id. at 135.
11 1d.
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agents for violation of several federal statutes, including the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention, as
well as for several common law torts. 11 2 The defendants moved
for summary judgment as to all.,counts.'8 3
The court dismissed the plaintiffs claims under the Federal
Aviation Act, the two civil rights statutes, and the Warsaw Con-
vention, but rejected the defendants' argument that the tort
claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act
("ADA").1 84 The court found that the plaintiffs claims were un-
related to Lufthansa's price, route or service since they arose
from incidents which occurred after the plaintiff was denied
boarding by Lufthansa. 85 The court also rejected the defend-
ants' argument that because "aviation security is a national con-
cern," they should be "automatically immune from suit."'86 The
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part and de-
nied it in part, and determined that plaintiff's tort claims for
false arrest, defamation, malicious prosecution, and civil con-
spiracy should proceed to trial.
E. WHISTLEBLOWER ACTS
1. Selim v. Pan American Airways Corp.
In Selim, a Pan American Airways Corp. ("Pan Am") pilot of
Egyptian descent sued the airline under the Florida
Whistleblower Act'87 after he was terminated. 88 Selim filed a
grievance against the airline after he was denied moving and
travel expenses, was subjected to numerous physical examina-
tions for alleged hearing loss issues, was passed over for a pro-
motion, and was fired after allegedly causing a disturbance prior
to a flight."' 9 The Pan Am Board of Adjustment ("Board") arbi-
trated these issues and found that Selim was entitled to mone-
tary damages and reinstatement, subject to a ninety day
suspension. 9 ° Selim then filed suit against Pan Am for viola-
182 Id. at 136-39.
183 Id. at 136.
184 Id. at 137-41.
185 Id. at 141.
186 Id.
187 Selim v. Pan Am. Airways Corp., 889 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).
188 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 448.101-448.105 (West 2005).
189 Selim, 889 So. 2d at 159.
190 Id. at 161.
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tions of the Florida Whistleblower Act and the Florida Civil
Rights Act,'' alleging that the Air Line Pilots Association repre-
sentative failed to raise his discrimination claims at the hearing.
The trial court granted Pan Am's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that Selim's claims were barred both by collateral
estoppel and resjudicata, based on the Board's proceedings, and
by preemption of the state law claims by the Airline Deregula-
tion Act ("ADA").
The Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's deci-
sion and remanded the case for further review. As to the issues
of collateral estoppel and resjudicata, the court found Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co. 9 2 persuasive in determining whether an ar-
bitration proceeding can bar a later discrimination suit. 93 Gard-
ner-Denver held that Title VII and applicable state statutes
addressing discrimination could not be supplanted by an arbi-
tration proceeding. 94
As to the trial court's determination that the ADA preempted
Selim's state law claims, the appeals court agreed with a line of
cases cited by Selim and found that employment discrimination
and whistle-blower retaliation were not related to air carrier ser-
vice." 5 Therefore, Selim's claims for racial discrimination
under the Florida Civil Rights Act and for retaliatory firing
under the Florida Whistleblower Act were not preempted by the
ADA.' 96 The appeals court additionally found that both claims
were also not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. 97
2. Gary v. The Air Group, Inc.
In Gay, the plaintiff sued his former employer, The Air
Group, Inc. ("AGI"), under the New Jersey Conscientious Em-
ployee Protection Act,'98 claiming that he was fired in retaliation
for questioning another pilot's qualifications. 99 After the dis-
19, FIA. STAr. ANN. §§ 760-765 (West 2005).
192 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
193 Selim, 889 So. 2d at 159.
194 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-57.
95 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d
1248 (11th Cir. 2003); Vanacore v. UNC Ardco Inc., 697 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 1997); Pohl v. Se. Airlines, Inc., 880 So. 2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 2004).
"16 Id. at 159.
197 Id. at 161.
98 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1-34:19-8 (West 2005).
19 Gary v. Air Group, Inc. 198 397 F.3d 183, 186, (3d Cir. 2005).
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trict court dismissed the plaintiffs action as preempted under
the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA") and the Whistleblower
Protection Program 20 ("WPP"), the plaintiff appealed.2 1
The appeals court found that the plaintiffs claims did not in-
volve price, route,.or service and were thus not preempted by
the ADA. The court distinguished other cases20 2 and found
that, because the plaintiff did not himself refuse to fly, he did
not affect any of AGI's scheduled flights. 20 3 In addition, his
questioning of the other pilot also did not affect service, as no
flights with that pilot had been scheduled which could be af-
fected. 20 4 As to the AGI's argument that the federal WPP
preempts all state whistleblower claims, the appeals court fol-
lowed the reasoning in Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.205and held
that the WPP did not affect the ADA preemption analysis for two
reasons-first, because the text of the WPP did not even men-
tion the issue of preemption, and second, because "courts
should not lightly infer preemption. '"2 °6
3. McBride v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc.
In McBride, four employees sued Gemini Air Cargo, Inc.
("Gemini") in Florida state court claiming that Gemini violated
the Florida Whistleblower Act by firing them after three of the
plaintiffs had witnessed an uncertified vendor install an aircraft
engine, and the fourth reported the incident to Gemini's presi-
dent.20 7 The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the
claims were preempted by both the Airline Deregulation Act
("ADA") and the Whistleblower Protection Program ("WPP"). 208
The Florida Court of Appeal found that neither the ADA nor
the WPP preempted plaintiffs' claims; price and route were not
involved, and the plaintiffs' actions in reporting their safety con-
cerns were too remote from Gemini's services to be preempted
200 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121 (West 2005).
201 Gary, 397 F.3d at 186.
202 Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2002); Branche v. Airtran
Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
203 Gary, 397 F.3d at 189.
204 Id.
205 Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
206 Gary, 397 F.3d at 190 (quoting Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,
491 (1987)).
207 McBride v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 915 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 3d Dist. 2005).
208 Id. at 188.
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under the ADA. ' The court followed the holding from Branche
v. Airtran Airways, Inc."" in determining that the WPP did not
preempt state whistleblower statutes nor did it affect the ADA in
any meaningful way.21I Rather, the WPP "simply added an addi-
tional remedy for plaintiffs seeking to advance a retaliatory dis-
charge claim."' Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's
dismissal and allowed the Florida Whistleblower Act claims to
proceed.
2 113
III. DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS
Deep Vein Thrombosis ("DVT") is a medical condition that
occurs when a blood clot forms in a deep vein, usually in the
leg.214 DVT can cause serious complications if the clot breaks
off and lodges in the brain, lungs, or heart, causing severe dam-
age to the organs.2 1 5 The analysis of a claimant's DVT claim dif-
fers depending on whether the injury occurred on an
209 1d.
210 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264.
21,1 The Whistleblower Protection Program provides:
(a) Discrimination against airline employees. No air carrier or con-
tractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an em-
ployee or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect
to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request
of the employee)-
(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide
(with any knowledge of the employer) or cause to be provided
to the employer or Federal Government information relating
to any violation or alleged violation of any order, regulation, or
standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or any other
provision of Federal law relating to air carrier safety tinder this
subtitle or any other law of the United States;
(2) has filed, caused to be filed, or is about to file (with any
knowledge of the employer) or cause to be filed a proceeding
relating to any violation or alleged violation of any order, regu-
lation, or standard of the Federal Aviation Administration or
any other provision of Federal law relating to air carrier safety
under this subtitle [49 USCS §§ 40101 et seq.] or an' other law
of the United States;
(3) testified or is about to testify in such a proceeding; or
(4) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate
in such a proceeding.
49 U.S.C.A. § 42121 (West 2005).
212 McBride, 915 So. 2d at 189 (quoting Branche, 342 F.3d at 1264).
213 1(1.
214 Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 381 (5th Cir. 2004).
215 Id. at 382.
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international or domestic flight. There were three significant
opinions on DVT liability for non-Warsaw domestic flights in
2005.216 The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California issued two opinions in the DVT Multidistrict
Litigation. One opinion involved claims against the defendant
airlines and the other opinion involved claims against Boeing.
A third case was from Wisconsin State Court. These cases ce-
mented the growing judicial precedent making recovery for
DVT claims from airlines or manufacturers difficult.
A. MDL: CLAIMS AGAINST AIRLINES-DOMESTIC FLIGHTS
1. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California considered the "non-Warsaw" DVT claims against the
defendant airlines in the pending Multi-District Litigation
("MDL") .217 The opinion addressed ten cases in the MDL,
which involved state law claims and did not involve international
flights or an interpretation of the Warsaw Convention.2 18 The
airline defendants moved jointly to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims
based on federal preemption, and the federal court granted the
motion.219
The non-Warsaw plaintiffs made three allegations: that seat-
ing configurations were dangerous and defective so as to create
a risk of developing DVT; that the seats were defectively de-
signed so as to create the same risk of developing DVT; and that
the defendants failed to warn the plaintiffs of the DVT risk or
inform them of steps that could have been taken to mitigate the
risk. The plaintiffs made state law claims for negligence, breach
of duty of a common carrier, products liability, and breach of
warranty.220
While the defendants' motions to dismiss were pending, the
Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in Witty v. Delta Airlines,
216 In 2004, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal addressed DVT
claims in the Warsaw context, holding that airlines were not liable to interna-
tional passengers who developed DVT during flight. Blansett v. Cont'l Airlines,
Inc., 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004); Rodriguez v. Ansett Austi. Ltd., 383 F.3d 914
(9th Cir. 2004).
217 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., No. 04-1606, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4043, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2005).
218 Id. at *9.
219 Id. at *10.
220 Id. at *11.
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Inc., 2 2 1 which had a significant impact on the MDL court. In
Witty, the plaintiff made a DVT claim against Delta Air Lines,
Inc. ("Delta"), alleging Delta's seating configuration did not
provide adequate legroom to prevent DVT and that Delta was
negligent in failing to warn passengers of the risks of DVT.222
The district court denied Delta's motion to dismiss, holding that
the plaintiffs claims were not preempted by federal law. The
Fifth Circuit unanimously reversed. 223 First, the court held the
plaintiffs defective seating configuration claim was preempted
by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), which expressly pre-
empted state laws "having the force and effect of law related to
price, route, or service of an air carrier. ' 224 Specifically, the
court held that providing additional legroom would require
Delta to decrease the number of seats on the aircraft, which
would have the effect of increasing prices.2 5 Second, the court
held that the failure to warn claim was subject to implied field
preemption by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.226 Finally, the
court held that airlines were not otherwise required by federal
law to provide any such warnings.227
Based on Witty, the MDL court directed the parties to include
in their briefs arguments regarding whether the court should
adopt or reject the Fifth Circuit's reasoning. After considering
the briefs, the MDL court adopted the Fifth Circuit's rationale
and expanded upon it, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. 22" The
MDL court first addressed the plaintiffs' defective seating con-
figuration argument.22 The plaintiffs had argued that the ADA
did not preempt common law personal injury claims and that,
even if some personal injury claims were preempted by the ADA,
the defendants' seating configuration claim was outside the
scope of the ADA because it did not relate to prices. 2 "0 The
court rejected both arguments. 2 1 ' The court held that the
ADA's "related to a price, route or service" language is a contin-
221 Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004).
222 Id. at 380-82.
223 Id.
224 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713 (West 2005).
225 Witty, 366 F.3d at 383.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 386.
228 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043, at *10, 37
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2005).
229 Id. at *18.
230 Id. at *19, 26.
231 Id. at *25, 29.
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uum with individual state law claims, including personal injury
claims, falling at various points. 23 2 Therefore, not all personal
injury claims are immune from ADA preemption. With respect
to plaintiffs' argument that seating configuration is not related
to price, the court held that the language of the ADA directs
courts to examine not only the "force" but also the "effect" a
state law has on price. 23' The ADA provides that a state "may
not enact or enforce a law, regulation or other provision having
the force and effect of a law related to a price, route or service
of an air carrier. 23 4
Following Witty, the court held that the ADA not only
preempts direct regulation of airline prices by states but also
preempts indirect regulation relating to prices that have the for-
bidden significant effect on any such prices. The court held
that requiring an airline to change its seating configuration
would have the forbidden significant economic effect of altering
pricing.235
The court next addressed the plaintiffs' claim of defective seat
design (as opposed to seat configuration), an issue not ad-
dressed in Witty. Conceding that defective seat design claims
would have no effect on price, the airlines argued that the
claims were instead impliedly preempted by the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 (the "Act") .236 The court agreed, reasoning
that the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") has enacted
numerous federal regulations governing the design, mainte-
nance, structure, and position of the aircraft seats.237 Also, as
with the defective seat configuration argument, the court noted
that allowing state law claims to proceed would lead to non-uni-
form decisions, creating an impossible situation for airlines.238
With respect to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims, the court
followed Witty and held that the Act impliedly preempted plain-
tiffs' failure to warn claims. 2 9 The court held that previous
Ninth Circuit decisions paralleled those of other circuits and
those of the United States Supreme Court in holding that Con-
232 Id. at *25.
233 Id.
234 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West 2005).
235 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043 at *29.
236 Id. at *48.
237 Id. at *48-49.




gress intended to centralize aviation regulation under the Act.2 1"
The court noted that the FAA has enacted numerous regula-
tions governing warnings and instructions that must be given to
airline passengers.241 Allowing state lawsuits to proceed based
on failure to warn of DVT would lead to non-uniformity of deci-
sions, which would make it impossible for airline defendants to
comply with pre-flight warnings applicable in different states.242
Thus, the court held that airline defendants were not liable for
failure to warn the non-Warsaw plaintiffs of the risks of DVT.24M
Finally, the court addressed plaintiffs' rather creative argu-
ment that they were not seeking to have the airlines reconfigure
the seats and were not contending that reconfiguration would
cure the problem. Rather, they argued that the airlines should
remain free to do nothing about the seats, but simply be re-
quired to compensate passengers who suffer personal injury as a
result of the cabin environment.2" '4 Rejecting that argument,
the court noted that the argument had been attempted once
before in cigarette litigation and had been rejected by the
United States Supreme Court.2 4 5
2. Miezin v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.
In Miezin, the plaintiff sued Midwest Express Airlines, Inc.
("Midwest") in Wisconsin state court, asserting that the airline
negligently failed to warn passengers about the dangers of
DVT.2 46 The trial court granted summary judgment to Midwest
based on federal preemption and because Midwest had no duty
under Wisconsin common law to warn passengers about DVT.z47
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court.2 4 The court held that the plaintiffs claims were based
solely on a state common law negligence theory and that such a
claim was impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of
24U Id.; United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1969); World Air-
ways, Inc v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978).
'2,4' In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4043 at *43.
242 Id. at *45.
'243 1d.
244 Id. at *31-32.
h245 I. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)).
2'4 Miezin v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2005).
247 Id. at 627.
248 Id.
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1958.249 The court discussed and followed the decision of Witty
v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 25
°
B. MDL: CLAIMS AGAINST MANUFACTURERS
1. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis
In this MDL opinion, the court addressed the plaintiffs' DVT
claims against The Boeing Company ("Boeing") .251 The plain-
tiffs developed DVT after traveling either on domestic or inter-
national flights on aircraft manufactured by Boeing.252 Plaintiffs
sued Boeing, alleging that the seats and seating configuration
on each of the aircraft were dangerous and defective so as to
create a risk of developing DVT. 253 In twelve of the seventeen
cases, Boeing manufactured the aircraft but did not install the
seating.254 In the remaining five cases, Boeing not only manu-
factured the aircraft but also installed the seating.2 55 However,
Boeing did not design, manufacture, or even purchase the seat-
ing in any of the cases; the seating was supplied by the
airlines.256
Boeing filed two motions for summary judgment: the first in-
volved the twelve cases in which it did not install seating, and the
second involved the five cases in which it did install the seating.
The court granted both motions.257 In the first motion, the
court held Boeing was not liable because it did not design, man-
ufacture, or install the allegedly defective seats.258 The plaintiffs
had argued Boeing was nevertheless responsible for defects in
the seats as part of the "completed product" doctrine from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A.259 The court re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that the completed
product supplied by Boeing was not an aircraft with seats, but an
aircraft without seats.26 ° It was thus undisputed that Boeing's
completed product did not have defective seats. 261
249 Id.
250 Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004).
251 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
252 Id. at 1058.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 1059.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1071.
258 Id. at 1062.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1063.
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Plaintiffs also argued that Boeing's seat tracking system was
defectively designed, because it permitted the airlines to config-
ure seats that were unsafe for passengers. The court refused to
place a duty upon Boeing to prohibit airlines from spacing seats
too closely, holding that Boeing would have no legal authority to
require the airlines to configure seats in a certain manner, be-
cause only the FAA would have that authority.
262
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that Boeing had a
duty to warn about DVT and defective seating conditions. The
court held that a manufacturer has no duty to warn a purchaser
of potentially dangerous products that exist in the world, or to
otherwise specify products that the manufacturer subjectively
believes are safer.2 6 3 The court further held that Boeing had no
duty to warn passengers of DVT, reasoning that a manufacturer,
after its product is sold, has no duty to warn a third party with
whom it has no contact that the purchaser of its product may or
may not have supplemented the completed product with a de-
fective piece of equipment. 26 4 Finally, the court rejected plain-
tiffs' theory that Boeing was "an integral part of the overall
producing and marketing enterprise" which had the duty to
warn the airlines about seating configuration." 5
The court also granted Boeing's motion as to the five cases in
which Boeing installed the seating. The court held that state law
precedent is universal that an installer of a defective product is
not liable to an end user for a defectively designed product. 26"
As such, even though Boeing installed the seats, the court held
it could have no liability to the plaintiffs.
26 7
IV. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958261 (the
"Act") and created the present-day Federal Aviation Administra-
tion ("FAA"). The Act authorizes the FAA to enact Federal Avia-
tion Regulations ("FAR"), which have the effect of laws.
While the Act provides federal jurisdiction for injunctive relief
262 Id. at 1065-66.
263 Id. at 1068.
264 I(.
265 Id. at 1066.
266 Id. at 1070.
267 Id. at 1071.
268 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101-50105 (West 2005).
269 49 U.S.C.A. § 106 (g) (West 2003).
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for any violations of the Act or any rule or FAR, there is no ex-
press or implied private right of action under the Act.271
A. No-FLY LIST
1. Green v. Transportation Security Administration
In Green, plaintiffs sued after they were identified on the
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") "No-Fly List,"
which contains the names of individuals who pose a risk to avia-
tion security and who are prohibited from flying. 271 The plain-
tiffs have the same or similar names as individuals identified on
the No-Fly List.27 2 They were routinely detained and searched
by airport personnel in front of co-workers and the general pub-
lic. 27 3 The TSA issues Security Directives which outline the pro-
cedures for airport personnel to follow if a passenger's name
appears on the No-Fly List.2 74 Plaintiffs sued the TSA in federal
district court alleging that the TSA's maintenance, manage-
ment, and dissemination of the No-Fly List violated plaintiffs'
Fifth Amendment due process rights and their Fourth Amend-
ment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 275 In its defense, the TSA claimed that it has instituted
an ombudsman process which allows passengers who are identi-
fied erroneously on the No-Fly List to clear their names from
the list.276 Only three of the plaintiffs had properly followed the
clearance procedures; the others either did not attempt to clear
their names or failed to use the established procedures in their
attempts. 27 7 Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the dis-
trict court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and,
in the alternative, that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.278
Under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), the United States Court of Ap-
peals has exclusive jurisdiction over final orders issued by the
Secretary of Transportation under the Federal Aviation Act.
The court first determined that the Security Directives issued by
270 Montawk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1986).
271 Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1120 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
272 Id. at 1122.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1121.
275 Id. at 1122.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1128.
27 Id. at 1122.
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the TSA were orders under § 46110(a) because, while not
lengthy, they impose an obligation or define legal rights. 27"' Be-
cause the directives were orders, the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over them and could not address
plaintiffs' claims relating to them.""° However, the court did de-
termine that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
challenge to the TSA's Ombudsman Clearance Procedures, as
these were not final orders but merely procedures that persons
could follow to clear their name from the No-Fly List.2"'
Plaintiffs also argued that even if the Security Directives were
orders, the district court had jurisdiction, because their com-
plaint raised broad constitutional challenges to the directives. If
the claims raised such challenges, and the challenges were not
"inescapably intertwined" with the directives themselves, then
the district court would have jurisdiction to hear the claims, re-
gardless of the jurisdictional rules set forth in § 46110(a).2 82
The court determined that plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment challenges were inescapably intertwined with the direc-
tives' because the court would be required to review the
procedures and merits of the No-Fly List itself. 8 ' The court ulti-
mately determined that only the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment
challenge to the Ombudsman Clearance Procedures could sur-
vive defendants' motion to dismiss under § 46110(a).28 4 How-
ever, this remaining claim could not survive defendants' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, since plaintiffs could not
show that their claim met the "stigma-plus" doctrine under the
Fifth Amendment.21 5 Under the stigma-plus doctrine, "Plaintiffs
must show (1) public disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by
the government, the accuracy of which is contested; plus (2) the
denial of some more tangible interest such as employment, or
the alteration of a right or status recognized by state law.
286
While plaintiffs may have suffered stigmatizing statements, they
were not deprived of any liberty or property rights while being
279 Id. at 1125.
280 Id.
2S] Id.
2112 Id. at 1126.
283 Id. at 1127.
21- Id. at 1128.
215 Id. at 1129.
2' Id.
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detained and searched by airport personnel, and accordingly,
the court dismissed their complaint." 7
B. TORT CLAIMS
1. Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc.
In Greene, the wife of a deceased pilot brought a wrongful
death action in federal district court in Kentucky, claiming that
there was a manufacturing defect in a gyroscope, which caused
the crash, and that the manufacturer had failed to warn of the
defect.2s8 Prior to trial, the trial court had granted defendant
B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc.'s ("Goodrich") motion to
dismiss the failure to warn claim.289 After trial, where plaintiff
was awarded substantial damages, defendants appealed the ver-
dict, and plaintiff cross-appealed the granting of partial sum-
mary judgment for Goodrich. 290
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial court that
the failure to warn claim was preempted by the Federal Aviation
Act (the "Act"). Plaintiff had argued at trial that Goodrich had
not maintained a database of malfunctions and employee con-
cerns, which might have warned users of the alleged gyroscope
defects. 291 Because the Act granted exclusive authority for avia-
tion regulation in the Federal Aviation Administration and the
plaintiff's claims were based on state law, the appeals court
found that the trial court was correct in finding her failure to
warn claims preempted by federal law.292
C. VALIDITY OF LIENS
1. Creston Aviation, Inc. v. Textron Financial Corp.
In Creston, the Florida Court of Appeal considered whether
Florida law,293 which requires an aircraft lien to be filed in the
county where services were last provided, was preempted by the
Federal Aviation Act (the "Act"), which requires liens to be filed
with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").294 Creston
287 Id. at 1130.




291 Id. at 794.
292 Id. at 795.
293 FLA. STAr. ANN. § 329.51 (West 2005).
294 Creston Aviation, Inc. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 900 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005).
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Aviation, Inc. ("Creston") acquired an artisan's lien against an
aircraft owned by Tack I, Inc. ("Tack") in which Textron Finan-
cial Corporation ("Textron") held a security interest.29 - After
Tack defaulted on the loan with Textron while the aircraft was
in Creston's possession, Textron filed a petition for writ of re-
plevin against Creston, claiming that Creston's lien was improp-
erly filed.296 Creston had filed its lien with the FAA's aircraft
registry office in Oklahoma City, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 44108.297 Textron claimed that this filing was improper be-
cause the lien was not also filed in Broward County, where Cres-
ton had performed repairs, pursuant to Florida Statute section
329.51.298
The court relied on the holding in In re Holiday Airlines
Corp.2 99 which stated the following: "The provisions of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act preempt State law insofar as they relate to the
priority of liens. But matters touching on the validity of liens are
determined by underlying State law. '30 0 The fact that the FAA
requires the filing of liens in its office in Oklahoma City did not
preclude the Florida legislature from requiring the filing in
Broward County.30 Because the issue here was enforceability
and not priority, the Florida statute was not preempted by the
federal law.30 2 Creston's failure to file the lien both with the
FAA in Broward County, Florida, resulted in an invalid lien.30 3
2. Triad International Maintenance Corp. v. Southern Air
Transport, Inc.
Southern Air Transport, Inc. ("SAT") hired Triad Interna-
tional Maintenance Corporation ("TIMCO") to perform mainte-
nance work on a DC8-73 aircraft that SAT leased from Aerolease
Financial Group, Inc. ("Aerolease").3 °4 SAT requested addi-
tional services from TIMCO, resulting in an unpaid balance of
over one million dollars.3 0 5 SAT made partial payments and
295 Id.
296 Id. at 728-29.
297 Id. at 728.
298 Id. at 729.
2- In re Holiday Airlines Corp., 620 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980).
31) Creston, 900 So. 2d at 730 (citations omitted).
301 Id. at 731.
302 Id. at 730-31.
33 Id. at 731.
304 Triad Int'l Maint. Corp. v. S. Air Transp., Inc., No. 2:04-CV-1200 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 33691 at *24 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2005).
305 Id. at *3.
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Aerolease guaranteed the remaining balances." 6 After SAT
paid TIMCO $100,000.00 to complete the maintenance, with
the remaining balance of $657,096.47 paid by Aerolease, SAT
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.10 7 The bankruptcy trustee sued TIMCO on behalf of SAT
to recover the $100,000.00, which the trustee characterized as
an avoidable preference.30 8 Both parties conceded that the first
four of the five requirements of an avoidable preference were
met, but TIMCO argued that it was a fully secured creditor of
SAT that would be entitled to the payment in the event of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 9
The court agreed with the trustee and found that TIMCO was
not a secured creditor of SAT, because it had not followed the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") filing requirements for
a conveyance, lease, or instrument executed for security pur-
poses as required by 49 U.S.C. § 44108.310 TIMCO argued that,
having performed the maintenance in North Carolina, a state
that does not accept filings for artisan's liens, the FAA would not
accept the filing since the lien would not be recognized in the
state where it arose.3 11 The court disagreed based upon the text
of the Federal Aviation Act which requires the filing of a notice
with the FAA for all conveyances which affect the title of air-
306 Id.
307 Id. at *34.
308 The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b), provides that:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section,
the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of
the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of
such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such credi-
tor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title.
309 Triad, 2005 U.S. District LEXIS 33691 at *7-8.
310 Id. at *11.
311 Id.
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craft." 2 Even though there was no requirement to record the
lien in North Carolina, and ". . . even if TIMCO's artisan's lien
was valid under North Carolina law, it is not enforceable against
the bankruptcy trustee, because TIMCO failed to record its in-
terest with the FAA. Thus, it cannot be said that TIMCO was a
fully secured creditor."3 '
Therefore, the FAA's recording statutes for conveyances,
leases, or instruments executed for security purposes must be
complied with regardless of the underlying state law where the
interest in the aircraft arose." 4
V. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act315 ("FSJA") estab-
lished the general rule that foreign states are immune from suits
in the United States. The FSIA defines a "foreign state" as:
(a) A "foreign state," except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or other-
wise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdi-
vision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other own-
ership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United
States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title nor
created under the laws of any third country.3 16
The FSIA also sets forth certain statutory exceptions to this
immunity. In 2005, courts construed three of the FSIA excep-
tions-commercial activity, waiver, and tort. Exceptions such as
these "provide the sole basis for obtaining subject matter juris-
diction over a foreign state and its instrumentalities in federal
court." '31 7
312 49 U.S.C.A. § 44107 (West 2005).
313 Triad, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33691 at *20.
314 Id. at *13.
:315 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1331, 1391, 1602-1611 (West 2005).
316 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a), (b) (West 2005).
317 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 782 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
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A. WAIVER AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTIONS
1. In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts
This declaratory judgment action arose out of EgyptAir Flight
990, which crashed on October 31, 1999 in the Atlantic Ocean
near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, resulting in the death of
all 217 individuals onboard. 8 Prior to this action, MISR Insur-
ance ("MISR"), EgyptAir's hull insurer, filed a subrogation ac-
tion against The Boeing Company ("Boeing") in an Egyptian
court.3 19 In this declaratory judgment action filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Boeing
sought to have the court hold that EgyptAir and MISR were con-
tractually barred from recovering damages against Boeing in
that subrogation action or otherwise. 2 °
MISR moved to dismiss Boeing's complaint on several
grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") and lack of "mini-
mum contacts" required by the due process clause to exercise
personal jurisdiction over MISR. The court denied MISR's
321motion.
The court first addressed MISR's claim that the case be dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court noted
that the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in the United States, and
that MISR qualified as a foreign state under the statute because
it was wholly owned by the Arab Republic of Egypt.3 22 Boeing
argued that MISR was not immune from jurisdiction under the
FSIA due to the "waiver" and "commercial activity" exceptions to
sovereign immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).23 That stat-
ute provides that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity in
any case
... in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either ex-
plicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver .... 24
318 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., 392 F. Supp. 2d 461, 462
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
319 Id. at 464.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 467.
323 Id. at 468.
324 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (1) (West 2005).
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or
... in which the action is based upon a commercial activity car-
ried on in the United States by the foreign state or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States...
The court held that MISR was subject to jurisdiction under
the waiver exception since it stood in EgyptAir's shoes and be-
cause EgyptAir expressly waived sovereign immunity in the For-
eign Air Carrier Permit that it filed with the Department of
Transportation. The court also found it important that when
EgyptAir purchased the subject aircraft from Boeing the con-
tracts executed between the companies provided, inter alia, that
EgyptAir waived rights against Boeing expressly including "any
obligation, right, claim or remedy in tort, whether or not arising
from the negligence of Boeing. '3 26 EgyptAir also agreed in the
contracts to indemnify Boeing and hold it harmless under cer-
tain circumstances for injury to any person or for loss of prop-
erty, to have Boeing named as an additional insured on
EgyptAir's aviation liability policy, and to have its hull insurance
carrier waive all rights of subrogation against Boeing.Y
2 7
The court also held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
MISR pursuant to the commercial activity exception based on
the third prong of the statute, that is, based on an act taken
outside the United States in connection with a commercial activ-
ity outside the country that caused a direct effect in the United
States.328 Specifically, the court held that MISR's issuance of the
insurance policy was clearly a commercial activity and that the
policy, which expressly incorporated terms of Boeing's agree-
ment with EgyptAir, was "taken in connection" with the com-
mercial activity. 29 The court further held that MISR's policy
had a direct effect in the United States by providing insurance
coverage to Boeing for the plane that it manufactured and
which was to be flown in the United States.33 0
325 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (2).
326 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., 392 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
327 Id. at 464-65.
328 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 2005).
329 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., 392 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
330 Id. at 469.
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The court next addressed MISR's minimum contacts argu-
ment. The court found that the five factors which must be con-
sidered in determining whether an exercise of personal
jurisdiction comports with "fair play and substantial justice"
under World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson331 were satisfied. 32
It held that MISR had sufficient minimum contacts with the
United States based on its issuance of the insurance policy nam-
ing Boeing as an additional insured with the expectation that
the plane would be flown in the United States. 333
2. Kirkham v. Societe Air France
In Kirkham, the plaintiff sued Air France in federal district
court in Washington, D.C. for negligence after she was injured
at Orly Airport while allegedly being assisted by an Air France
employee. 3 4 The plaintiff believed that the "blue-uniformed
man" who assisted her navigation through the airport, during
which she fell and injured her foot, worked for Air France, and
Air France never disputed the claim. 5 Air France moved for
summary judgment claiming that, because the Republic of
France owned a majority stake in the company at the time plain-
tiff was injured, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")
deprived the court of subject matterjurisdiction. 6 In response,
plaintiff argued that the commercial activity exception applied,
because she purchased the ticket in the United States, and the
district court agreed.337
The appeals court affirmed, finding that the applicability of
the commercial activity exception of the FSIA depended on de-
termining whether the plaintiff's negligence claim was "based
upon" her purchase of the ticket from Air France, since the ex-
ception is only applicable when the sovereign's commercial ac-
tivity is necessary to the plaintiff's claim. 8 In other words,
... so long as the alleged commercial activity establishes a fact
without which the plaintiff will lose, the commercial activity ex-
ception applies, regardless of whether the plaintiff has either al-
331 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
332 In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., 392 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
333 Id. at 470.
334 Kirkham v. Societe Air Fr., 429 F.3d 288, 290 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
335 Id. at 290-91.
336 Id. at 290.
337 Id. at 290-91.
338 Id. at 291-92; Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
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leged or provided sufficient evidence of the additional facts
necessary to prevail on the merits.3"'
Because Air France conceded that the ticket purchase was a
commercial activity and because the plaintiff has to establish the
sale in order to prevail on her negligence claim, the court found
that the FSIA's commercial activity exception was applicable.
3 411
B. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY AND TORTS EXCEPTIONS
1. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (January 18,
2005)
In this opinion issued by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in the Multi-District Litigation
action based on the September 11 th related cases, District Court
Judge Richard Casey held that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
two Saudi Arabian princes were immune from suit for alleged
support of terrorist acts based on sovereign immunity.. 4 The
plaintiffs sued Prince Sultan ("Sultan"), Saudi Arabia's Minister
of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General, alleging that he
met with Osama bin Laden after Iraq invaded Kuwait in the
summer of 1990 and that he took actions to support and fund
several Islamic charities sponsoring Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda 42 The plaintiffs also sued Prince Turki ("Turki"), Saudi
Arabia's Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the Director
of Saudi Arabia's Department of General Intelligence, alleging
that he met with Osama bin Laden several times and offered bin
Laden the use of his family's engineering equipment and pro-
vided other financial support to Al Qaeda14 1 In addition, the
plaintiffs sued the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the National
Commercial Bank ("NCB"), the first commercial bank of Saudi
Arabia.144 The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.145
The court held that the FSIA extends immunity to agents of a
foreign state acting in their official capacities, since that is the
equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly.3 46 The court
33" Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292.
340 Id. at 293.
341 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 837-38
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
342 Id. at 784.
3 43 Id. at 785.
344 Id. at 786-87.
3'45 Id. at 780-81.
346 Id. at 789.
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held that immunity was thus available not only to the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, but also to Sultan and Turki to the extent their
alleged actions were performed in their official capacities on be-
half of Saudi Arabia, unless an exception to the FSIA applied. 47
The court held that resolution of NCB's status could not be de-
termined and that additional discovery was needed on that
issue. 48
Considering whether any FSIA exceptions applied to Sultan
and Turki or to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the court held
that the commercial activities exception outlined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (2) was not applicable, because the defendants were
not engaged in commercial activity. Commercial activity con-
notes "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a par-
ticular commercial transaction or act. ' 349 The court held that
the defendants' contributions to terrorist charities could not be
considered a commercial activity. 35° The court also held that
the state sponsored terrorist exception did not apply, because
Saudi Arabia has never been formally designated as a state spon-
sor of terrorism. 51
Finally, the court held that the torts exception found in 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a) (5) was also inapplicable. The torts exception
deprives a foreign sovereign of immunity in actions
... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state
for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his office or employment;
except this [exception] shall not apply to
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless
of whether the discretion be abused. 52
The court held that the FSIA's discretionary function excep-
tion is analogous to that found in the Federal Tort Claims Act
and is based on intent by the courts "to preserve immunity for
decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy. 353
The court held that the discretionary function exception barred
347 Id.
3- Id. at 792.
349 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d)).
350 Id. at 793.
351 Id.
352 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (5)).
353 Id. at 794.
148
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the plaintiffs' claims against the princes, because their actions in
allegedly aiding the terrorist organizations were made at the
planning level of government and grounded in social, eco-
nomic, and political policy of Saudi Arabia.354 Accordingly, the
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaints
against them based on the discretionary function exception.3 55
The court also held that there was not sufficient evidence to war-
rant exercising personal jurisdiction over Sultan or Turki 56
2. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (September 21,
2005)
In this second opinion in the September 11, 2001 MDL,Judge
Casey followed the rationale from his previous opinion.3 57 The
plaintiffs alleged certain Saudi princes and the Saudi High Com-
mission ("SHC") were liable to them pursuant to various theo-
ries, including violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act,3 58 the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 59 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act,36 the Torture Victim Protection Act,36' and other
state law tort claims.362 The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA
and for lack of personal jurisdiction. 6 The court held that the
SHC was an organ of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that it
had not waived its sovereign immunity. 6 4 The court further
found, to the extent the plaintiffs' allegations concerned actions
taken by the princes in their official capacities, they were also
entitled to immunity as foreign states.36 5
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were liable under
the torts exception to the FSIA. The court disagreed, holding
that the defendants' actions were protected by the discretionary
function exception to the torts exception to the FSIA, because
their actions were undertaken in accordance with governmental
354 Id. at 802.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 813-14.
357 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
358 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2331-2339D (West 2005).
359 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2005).
3- 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961-1968 (West 2005).
361 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
362 In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
363 Id. at 546-47.
364 Id. at 553.
365 Id. at 555-56.
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policy. 366 The court also held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy
the constitutional requirement of due process by showing that
the princes had sufficient minimum contacts with the United
States, and, therefore, granted their motion to dismiss. 6 v
VI. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The government is generally immune from suits for money
damages under the principle of sovereign immunity. However,
the government has enacted a broad waiver of that immunity
through the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), which autho-
rizes suits against the government for money damages
• . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.368
This waiver of immunity is far from absolute, and many impor-
tant classes of tort claims are excepted from the FTCA's cover-
age. One such exception to the waiver is the discretionary
function exception, which preserves immunity for decisions
grounded in public policy. There were four significant legal
opinions construing the FTCA in 2005, three of which involved
the discretionary function exception.
A. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION AND INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR EXCEPTIONS
1. FAA Enforcement Actions
a. Stables v. United States
On February 16, 2000, Emery World Airlines ("EWA") Flight
17, utilizing a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, lost pitch control
on take-off.369 The aircraft became uncontrollable and crashed,
killing the crew members.3 7 0 The cause of the crash was an im-
properly secured flight control bolt on the aircraft's elevator as-
sembly.371 The bolt was improperly secured either during
366 Id. at 556.
367 Id. at 559.
368 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West 2005).





maintenance by Tennessee Technical Services, a Federal Avia-
tion Administration ("FAA") certified repair station, or during
subsequent maintenance by EWA personnel. 72
The decedent's estate sued the United States pursuant to the
FTCA in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio. The plaintiff claimed the FAA was negligent in its
oversight and enforcement of its regulations and that the FAA's
negligence proximately caused the crash. 73 The evidence
showed that EWA had a history of serious FAA violations stem-
ming from improper maintenance practices, which had resulted
in the suspension of maintenance practices and issuance of sev-
eral FAA certification actions.374 The FAA had threatened to
shut down EWA's maintenance department but had failed to
take that action before the maintenance work that resulted in
the crash had been performed.175 The plaintiff claimed the FAA
was negligent in not taking stronger action against EWA. 1 76
The United States moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the FAA's en-
forcement actions with regard to the aircraft's maintenance op-
erations fell within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA. The court agreed and dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 77
The court applied the two-part test for determining whether a
governmental act falls within the discretionary function excep-
tion as set out by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Gaubert. ' 7' The first step is to determine whether the
action involves an element of judgment or choice.179 If the an-
swer to that question is yes, then the court must determine
whether the action is of a type that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield."" Only choices grounded in
the "social, economic or political goals" of the statute or regula-
tion are protected.'
Applying this two-part test, the court first held that the Secre-
tary of Transportation's orders authorized the FAA to use its
372 Id.
373 Id. at 562.
374 Id. at 564.
375 Id. at 565-66.
376 Id. at 562.
377 Id. at 573.
378 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
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judgment and experience to carry out the policies of the FAA.3 2
Therefore, the guidelines were not specific mandates but al-
lowed for discretion."8 " Having satisfied the first part of the test,
the court then considered whether the FAA actions were the
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield.4
The court reviewed the reasoning of United States v. S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air Lines)8 5 for gui-
dance. In that case, the Supreme Court held that actions of the
FAA in inspecting an aircraft and issuing a type certificate fell
within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.38 6 Fol-
lowing Varig Air Lines, the court held that the FAA's action in
implementing a mechanism for compliance review was similarly
a discretionary activity protected by the discretionary function
exception. 7 The court held that the adoption and enforce-
ment of FAA rules are grounded in the "social, economic and
political policies of assuring air safety" and thus fit within the
exception. 38 8  The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8 9
2. Negligence of Private Air Traffic Controllers
a. Alinsky v. United States
In Alinsky, the Seventh Circuit held that the United States was
not liable under the FTCA for the negligence of an air traffic
controller employed by a private air traffic control company
hired by the United States.3 90 Alinsky involved a mid-air collision
between two private airplanes over the Chicago lakefront.3 91 At
the time of the crash, both airplanes were receiving air traffic
control services from Midwest Air Traffic Control, Inc. ("Mid-
west"), a private contractor hired by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration ("FAA") to provide air traffic control services for
382 Id. at 569.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 United States v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S.
797 (1984).
386 Id. at 819.
387 Stables, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 570-71.
388 Id. at 572.
389 Id. at 573.
390 Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2005).
391 Id. at 641.
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Meigs Field. 92 Plaintiffs sued various defendants, including the
United States pursuant to the FTCA, alleging that the air traffic
controller negligently failed to inform the pilots that they were
on a collision course.3 93
The plaintiffs alleged the United States was liable on the fol-
lowing four grounds: (1) it was vicariously liable for the control-
ler's negligence, because it had a non-delegable duty to provide
air traffic control services; (2) it was directly negligent for al-
lowing an untrained and unqualified controller to staff Meigs;
(3) it had no authority to hire an independent contractor to
perform the controller services; and (4) it negligently delayed
approving additional staffing at Meigs19 4
The district court granted summary judgment to the United
States, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to con-
sider the plaintiffs' claims under the FTCA. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court.3 95 First, the court rejected the plain-
tiffs' argument that the United States was liable because air traf-
fic control services were non-delegable. 96 The plaintiff argued
that Illinois law dictated that abnormally dangerous activities,
such as air traffic control, were non-delegable 97 The court
held that, by enacting the FTCA's independent contractor ex-
ception, Congress did not simultaneously adopt state law excep-
tions to the independent contractor rule. 98 Rather, Congress
expressly granted jurisdiction for suits brought against the
United States based on its employees' conduct, and expressly
excluded claims based on the conduct of independent contrac-
tors.3 99 State common law principles could not overcome that
federal mandate.400
Second, the court held it had no jurisdiction to consider the
plaintiffs' claims based on the controller's negligence, because
he was an employee of Midwest, which was an independent con-
tractor and therefore not a "federal agency" as defined by 28
U.S.C. § 2671. That definition of federal agency expressly ex-
cludes "any contractor with the United States."'"'"
392 Id. at 641-42.
393 Id. at 642.
394 Id. at 642, 644.
395 Id. at 649.





40 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (West 2005).
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Third, the court considered the plaintiffs' argument that the
United States was directly negligent, because it allowed Midwest
to staff the control tower with an unqualified controller. In re-
jecting the argument, the court relied upon the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA.40 2 The court followed the two-
step test promulgated by the United States Supreme Court to
determine whether the discretionary function should apply.4 °3
First, the court must determine whether the government em-
ployee violated a specific mandatory statute, regulation, or pol-
icy.4" 4 Second, the court must determine whether the conduct
involved was the type of conduct that Congress intended to
shield from liability, as only governmental action based upon
considerations of public policy are exempt.40 5 Utilizing this
analysis, the court first held that the government did not violate
a specific mandatory statute.40 6 Applying the second step, the
court held that the government's decision to contract with pri-
vate companies for air traffic control services was based on budg-
etary concerns as well as a desire to reopen smaller air traffic
control locations, both of which are government policy deci-
sions.40 7 The court thus held that the discretionary function ex-
ception protects the government from claims premised on the
lack of training, oversight, or qualifications of the air traffic
controllers.40 8
Fourth, the court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the
United States lacked the authority to hire private contractors to
provide air traffic control services. The plaintiffs relied upon 49
U.S.C. § 1344(h), which gives the FAA authority to make con-
tracts with state or political subdivisions but not with private par-
ties. 40 9 Rejecting that argument, the court held the FAA was not
relying on that statute for authority but rather on two other fed-
eral statutes, 49 U.S.C. § 106(1) (6) and 49 U.S.C. § 40110, both
of which provide the FAA Administrator with general authority
to contract for services with entities for the operation of facilities
and installations. 410 The court held that those statutes authorize
402 Alinsky, 415 F.3d at 647.
403 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
404 Alinsky, 415 F.3d at 647.
405 Id.
406 Id.
407 Id. at 648.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 644.
410 Id.
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the FAA to enter into contracts as necessary, including contracts
for services to operate air traffic control facilities, even though
they do not specifically mention air traffic control facilities. 41
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
United States negligently failed to respond to Midwest's request
for additional funding for air traffic controllers. The evidence
showed that Midwest made a non-emergency request for addi-
tional funding and that the FAA granted the request.412 Al-
though the funding had not been provided at the time of the
crash, the court held that the delay in FAA funding was not
unreasonable.41 3
b. Collins v. United States
Collins involved another mid-air collision of two aircraft near
the Waukegan Regional Airport ("Waukegan") in Illinois.4 14
The plaintiffs filed claims against the United States under the
FTCA, alleging it committed numerous acts of negligence re-
garding the operation of the air traffic control tower at Wauke-
gan.4 15 The control tower was operated pursuant to a private
contract between the FAA and Midwest Air Traffic Control Ser-
vices, Inc. ("Midwest Services"), a private corporation.416 The
plaintiffs made the following three claims against the United
States: (1) that the government negligently failed to install a
Terminal Automated Radar Display and Information System
(TARDIS); (2) that the government was liable for the negli-
gence of the air traffic controller; and (3) that the government
negligently administered and oversaw the control tower.4 1 7
The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the discre-
tionary function and independent contractor exceptions were
applicable, depriving the court of jurisdiction. The court first
considered whether the FAA's decision not to provide TARDIS
to Waukegan, a visual flight rules airport, qualified for exemp-
tion under the FTCA discretionary function test.41 The court
stated that a discretionary decision is only shielded if it is suscep-
41, Id.
412 Id. at 646.
413 Id. at 646-47.
414 Collins v. United States, Nos.: 03-C-2958, 03-C-2998, 03-C-3162, 03-C-3166,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7470, *1-2 (N.D. Ill. April 19, 2005).
415 Id. at *2-3.
416 Id. at *3.
417 Id. at *4.
419 Id. at *13.
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tible to policy judgments which involve the exercise of "social,
economic and political" judgments.419 The plaintiffs argued
that the government's decision was not based on public policy
considerations because the FAA chose to install TARDIS at some
eligible airports and not others, based primarily upon which air-
port did the best congressional lobbying.4 2' The plaintiffs ar-
gued that, once the FAA decided to install TARDIS at some but
not all eligible airports, it could not argue that the decision was
protected by the discretionary function exception.421
The court agreed with the plaintiffs, relying on the precedent
of Cope v. Scott.422 In that case, the court held that where the
government placed numerous traffic warning devices on a busy
airport parkway but failed to place a "slippery when wet" sign at
a particularly dangerous place, it could not argue that its deci-
sion was based on public policy concerning aesthetics and thus
protected by the discretionary function exception.4 23 Relying
upon Cope, the court held that the government's decision to in-
stall TARDIS at some eligible airports and not others dictated
that the discretionary function exception had not been
established.424
The court also considered the plaintiffs' claims that the
United States was liable for negligently overseeing the control
tower and vicariously liable for the controller's negligence. The
government argued that the independent contractor exception
applied, because Midwest Services was an independent contrac-
tor.4 25 Under the FTCA, the government is only liable for torts
"caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment .... "426 The definition of an "employee
of the government" excludes "any contractor with the United
States. '4 27 Whether Midwest Services was an independent con-
419 Id. at *12.
420 Id. at *13.
421 The plaintiff showed that the FAA's general policy was not to install termi-
nal radar displays unless the airport had over 30,000 itinerant operations per
year. The FAA had not installed any such device at Waukegan even though it had
over 300,000 itinerant operations per year, and was thus clearly eligible. Id. at *9-
10.
422 Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
423 Collins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7470 at *14-15.
424 Id. at *15-17.
425 Id. at *5.
426 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 2005).
427 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (West 2005).
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tractor depended on whether the government had authority to
control the physical performance of the company.4 28 Because
there were insufficient facts in the record to prove the excep-
tion, the court held that the government had not established
the exception for jurisdictional purposes, and that the court re-
tained subject matter jurisdiction.429
B. INTENTIONAL TORTS/WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
1. Whedbee v. United States
In Whedbee, plaintiff was an FAA employee who brought state
law claims against her supervisor and co-workers in state court,
alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious in-
terference with contract, and civil conspiracy.43 °  Plaintiff
claimed she was harassed at the office by her supervisor and co-
workers because of her "friendly, garrulous and outgoing per-
sonality."43' She claimed they chastised her in front of other
employees, reported false accusations about her to others, and
got other clerical employees to register complaints about her.4 2
The United States removed the case to federal court and then
successfully moved the court to substitute the United States as
the correct defendant in place of the individual FAA employees.
As a predicate to the removal, and pursuant to the requirements
of the FTCA, the U.S. Attorney certified that the defendant em-
ployees were acting within the scope of their employment at the
time the incident arose.433
The court considered motions by both parties. The plaintiff
moved the court to reconsider the substitution of the United
States as a defendant. She argued that the FTCA did not apply,
because it does not waive sovereign immunity as to claims for
intentional conduct, and further that intentional conduct by
definition is outside the scope of employment. 4 The court de-
nied the motion on technical and substantive grounds.4 3 5 The
court held that the certification by the U.S. Attorney that the
federal employees acted within their scope of employment was
conclusive evidence the lawsuit was properly removed to federal
428 Collins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7470 at *18.
429 Id.
431 Whedbee v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
431 Id. at 621.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 620.
434 Id. at 634-24.
435 Id. at 624.
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court.436 Once a case has been removed, the FTCA applies to
the suit, whether or not the conduct alleged is in fact an inten-
tional tort.437 If that certification is challenged, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
federal employee was acting outside the scope of employment to
defeat removal.438 In making that determination, the court
must apply the respondent superior law of the state where the tor-
tious conduct occurred.439 In this case, the court held that,
while North Carolina courts have rarely found intentional torts
to be within the scope of employment, intentional torts can be
considered within the scope if they were committed in the
course of activities that the employee was authorized to per-
form.440 The court held that the plaintiff failed to meet her bur-
den to show that the FAA employees acted outside the scope of
their employment and thus denied plaintiffs motion.4 4 1
The court granted the United States' motion to dismiss and
motion for summary judgment.442 The court that held the
plaintiff could only assert her common law tort claims under the
FTCA and that the FTCA required that an administrative claim
be filed as a prerequisite, which the plaintiff had failed to do.44 3
The court therefore held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the plaintiff s claims based on that failure.444 Addition-
ally, the court noted that, even if the plaintiff had exhausted her
administrative remedies, the court still would have lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the case, because the FTCA does
not waive sovereign immunity for the types of intentional tort
claims made by the plaintiff.445 Claims for tortious interference
with a contract are specifically excluded by the FUCA, as are
claims for assault, battery, etc.44 6 "This immunity applies even
where federal law does not otherwise provide a remedy against
the United States. 447
436 Id.
437 Id.
438 Id. at 625.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id. at 626.
442 Id. at 627-28.
443 Id.





VII. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Forum non conveniens is the doctrine used by courts to decline
jurisdiction even where there is subject matter jurisdiction, per-
sonal jurisdiction over all parties, and proper venue in the case.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,44 the Supreme Court set forth the
various private factors44 " and public factors"" to be taken into
consideration by courts when determining whether a foreign
venue is more appropriate. Although forum non conveniens was
used after Gilbert to allow federal courts to dismiss cases for re-
filing in other federal district courts, the current doctrine gener-
ally applies in federal court when the more convenient forum is
a foreign country.4
5 1
A. MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED
1. Fatkhiboyanovich v. Honeywell International, Inc.
On July 21, 2002, a mid-air collision occurred between a
Bashkirian Airways aircraft flying a charter flight between Mos-
cow and Barcelona and a DHL cargo aircraft flying between Ber-
gamo, Italy and Brussels.4 52 The accident took place after the
air traffic controllers instructed the DHL crew to "descend" and
the Bashkirian Airways crew first to "climb" but then to "expe-
dite descent.''4115 After all passengers onboard both aircraft were
killed, some of the families sued the airlines as well as the Traffic
Collision Avoidance System ("TCAS") manufacturers. 54 A law-
suit was first filed in Spain against Bashkirian Airways.4 5 5 Then,
on July 1, 2004, the subject litigation was filed in the Superior
448 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
449 The private factors from Gilbert are (1) "the relative ease of access to sources
of proof;" (2) "availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;" (3) "possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action;" (4) "all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive;" and (5)
"the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained." Id. at 508.
45o The public factors from Gilbert are (1) administrative difficulties due to
court congestion; (2) the burden ofjury duty on a community with no relation to
the litigation; (3) the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home;" and (4) judicial interest in a forum familiar with the applicable law. Id. at
508-509.
451 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 2005).
452 Fatkhiboyanovich v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. No. 04-4333, 2005 U.S. Dist.
tEXIS 23414, *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2005).
453 Id.
54 See id. at *4.
455 Id.
2006]
160 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE [71
Court of NewJersey against the manufacturers.4 56 After the case
was removed to the United States District Court for the District
of NewJersey, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on
forum non conveniens grounds.457
In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court
found that they had met the two-part test in Lacey v. Cessna Air-
craft Co.,458 since they had shown both that an adequate alterna-
tive forum existed in Spain and that the public and private
factors from Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert459 weighed in favor of dismis-
sal. As for the private factors, the court found that Spain was an
adequate alternative forum for several reasons. First, the moving
defendant agreed to voluntarily submit to Spanish jurisdiction
and waive its statute of limitations defense.46 ° In addition, the
court afforded little deference to the plaintiffs' choice of forum,
since they were not domestic plaintiffs.4 6" ' The public factors
also weighed in favor of dismissal, mainly due to the litigation
already ongoing in Spain by the plaintiffs against Bashkirian.
462
Although the plaintiffs' allegations against the manufacturers
arose out of the training manuals and procedures developed in
the United States, the majority of witnesses as well as the acci-
dent site were located in Europe, and the defendants agreed to
produce witnesses located outside Europe.463 In addition, be-
cause of the case already filed in Spain, evidence had already
been assembled by the plaintiffs in that forum.4 64 New Jersey
would be an inappropriate forum since none of the defendants'
alleged acts took place there and because New Jersey law would
not apply.4 65 Because the accident occurred in Europe and be-
cause plaintiffs already filed suit against other responsible par-
ties in Spain, the court found that dismissal was appropriate.466
2. Gambra v. International Lease Finance Corp.
In Gambra, a California federal district court determined that
the appropriate forum for the litigation was in France, not Cali-
456 Id. at *3.
457 Id. at *4-5.
458 Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 1991).
459 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert., 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
460 Fatkhiboyanovich, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23414 at *4.
461 Id. at *7.
462 Id. at *14.
463 Id. at *13.
464 Id.
465 Id. at *18.
466 Id. at *22.
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fornia.467 The plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit following the
crash of a Flash Airlines ("Flash") Flight 604 between Egypt and
France in 2004.468 The aircraft was manufactured by The Boe-
ing Company, sold to International Lease Finance Corporation
("ILFC"), which was headquartered in California, and leased to
Flash, an Egyptian company.469 Additional defendants, Parker
Hannifin Corporation and Honeywell International, Inc., who
manufactured certain component parts on the aircraft, were
also United States corporations."') The defendants jointly
moved to dismiss on the grounds that France was an adequate
alternative forum and that the public and private interest factors
favored dismissal from the California court.4 7 '
The court granted the motion to dismiss, conditioned upon a
French court agreeing to assert jurisdiction over the case which
involved non-French defendants. 47 2 The defendants agreed to
submit to personal jurisdiction in France and waive their statute
of limitations defense for 120 days after dismissal. 473 The court
found that the French forum was an adequate alternative, be-
cause the plaintiffs' claims of strict liability, negligence, and
breach of warranty were recognized claims in France.474 In addi-
tion, the court system in France would provide all parties with
adequate procedural safeguards and a fair forum for the
proceedings.475
The court also found that both the private and public interest
factors weighed in favor of dismissal. Because the majority of
the relevant evidence was located in France or Egypt, compared
to only a small amount in California, and because defendants
agreed to produce the California evidence in a French court,
the court found that the ease of access to sources of proof
weighed in favor of dismissal.47 6 As to the availability of wit-
nesses, the court found that, because defendants agreed to pro-
duce all witnesses in France, this factor also favored dismissal.477





471 Id. at 813.
472 Id. at 810.
473 Id. at 828.
474 Id.
475 Id. at 817, 825.
476 See id. at 825.
477 Id. at 828.
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Finally, the court found' that the forum-selection clause in the
contract between ILFC and Flash did not compel a finding that
California was the most appropriate forum.4 7 Because plaintiffs
had already filed suit against Flash in France, the court found
that it would be more convenient to have both cases proceed
there.479
The court determined that the public interest factors also
weighed in favor of dismissal.48 0 The court found that, although
the leasing company did business in California, the majority of
the decedents were French citizens, creating a greater interest
in the outcome of the litigation in France. 41 Finally, because
either Egyptian or French law could apply, the court held that
the choice of law also weighed in favor of dismissal.48 2
B. MoTION TO DISMISS DENIED
1. Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc.
In Ellis, the defendants appealed the trial court's denial of
their motions to dismiss actions brought by Katherine A. Ellis
("Ellis") andJovy Layug ("Layug").483 Their lawsuits arose out of
the crash of Air Philippines Corp. ("Air Philippines") Flight 541,
involving an aircraft manufactured by The Boeing Company,
purchased by AAR.Parts Trading, Inc. ("AAR"), and sold to Fleet
Business Credit, LLC ("Fleet") after being leased to Air Philip-
pines Corp. Plaintiffs Ellis and Layug filed separate lawsuits in
Cook County, Illinois, with multiple other plaintiffs added later
to the Layug case.48 4
Although the court found jurisdiction over the appeals, it af-
firmed the trial court's decision by finding that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in denying the defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.485 In reviewing
the trial court's analysis of the private interest factors, it found it
significant that defendants AAR and Fleet had their principal
places of business located in Illinois:
478 Id. at 814 n.3.
479 Id. at 810.
480 Id. at 825.
481 Id.
482 Id. at 811.
483 Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., 357 Il. App. 3d 723, 727 (West 2005).
484 Id. at 730, 731.
485 Id. at 723.
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• it is incredulous for two Illinois resident corporations to argue that
their home state is inconvenient to them to litigate this matter. It is also
incredulous to observe that the defendants thoroughly ignore the fact that
the theories of liability pled against them concern the alleged defective con-
dition of the aircraft prior to its transfer to Air Philippines, and there has
been no assertion by the defendants that the sources of proof, records, and
witness on these issues are not located in Illinois.
486
In addition, because the accident site located in the Philippines
had been paved over, it would not even be possible to view it.4 8 7
The court also rejected the defendants' argument regarding
their inability to bring a third-party claim against either Air Phil-
ippines or the Philippines Air Transportation Office should the
case remain in Cook County, as no such claim had been filed by
either defendant.488 Therefore, the private interest factors
weighed in favor of keeping venue in Illinois.
The public interest factors also weighed in favor of Illinois
rather than the Philippines.48 9 The court found that, because
the defendants and owners of the aircraft were residents of Illi-
nois, the citizens of Illinois and potential jurors had an interest
in the case.49 In cases "where the potential trial witnesses are
scattered among different forums, neither forum enjoys a pre-
dominant connection to the litigation.""' While the court
agreed with the defendants that the Cook County courts were
congested, it found this factor insufficient for not retaining ju-
risdiction over the case when the other public interest factors
weighed against dismissal.49
In upholding the trial court's denial of the defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss, the court focused on the facts that the defend-
ants were residents of Illinois and that neither Illinois nor the
Philippines had a predominant connection with the case. While
the court acknowledged that either forum would be appropri-
ate, it affirmed the decision, because the trial court had not
abused its discretion.' 3
486 Id. at 743.
487 See id.
48 Id. at 746.
489 Id. at 747.
490 1d.
49 Id.
492 Id. at 748.
493 Id.
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2. Hewett v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.
In Hewett, the lawsuit arose out of the crash of a charter flight
in Australia in September, 2000. 494 The plaintiffs, citizens of
New Zealand, brought a products liability suit against Raytheon
Aircraft Company, a Kansas corporation, and Professional Avia-
tion Associates, Inc., a Georgia corporation, in the Superior
Court of Fulton County, Georgia.495 In 2004, the trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds, in which the defendants argued that Australia
was the more appropriate forum for the action.496 In 2005, the
Georgia General Assembly passed legislation codified as
O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31.1, which set forth the factors to be used
by courts in determining whether to dismiss actions based on
forum non conveniens grounds.497
The Georgia Court of Appeals first determined that the new
code section applied to the case since it was pending on the
effective date of the statute.498 Second, the court determined
that in light of this new statute, the trial court's order should be
remanded for application of the new statute.499 While defend-
ants argued that the trial court must have evaluated the forum
non conveniens factors from AT&T Corp. v. Sigala,5 °° since the
case was cited in the court's order, the appeals court found that
it could not determine whether these factors were considered
and remanded the case. In addition, the court found that re-
mand was warranted, because the forum non conveniens factors
from Sigala and O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31.1 were different. 5°1
The court also found that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-10-
31.1, the defendants were required to file a written stipulation
prior to filing their motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds.0 2 While the defendants argued that this would make
the new statute supplant the requirements in O.C.G.A. section
50-2-2 1, another Georgia forum non conveniens statute, the court
found that, because O.C.G.A. section 50-2-21 only applied to
cases filed after July 1, 2003, there was no conflict between the
494 Hewett v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 614 S.E. 2d 875, 876-877 (Ga. App. 2005).
495 Id. at 876.
496 Id. at 877.
497 Id.
498 Id. at 878.
4- Id. at 879.
500 AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2003).
501 Hewett, 614 S.E.2d at 881.
502 Id. at 881-882.
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statutes in the present case. However, the court declined to ad-
dress whether O.C.G.A. section 9-10-31.1 impliedly repealed
O.C.G.A. section 50-2-21.5o3
3. Holsinger v. Nickell
In this case, the issue was not forum non conveniens as between
a domestic and foreign venue but rather the issue of changing
venue between district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).5 °4 In
Holsinger, the defendant filed a motion to change venue from
the District Court in Kansas to federal court in Iowa.5 °5 The case
arose out of the crash of a plane sold by Larry Smith ("Smith")
of AmeriPlanes, Inc. ("AmeriPlanes") to Terrance Thornton, in
which a passenger, Jerry Holsinger, was killed. 50 6 The court
found that, because Kansas was chosen as the venue by the
plaintiff, was the resident state of the plaintiff, and was the loca-
tion of the accident, it would be inappropriate to transfer venue
to Iowa simply because it was the resident state of Smith and
AmeriPlanes. Because the transfer would merely shift the bur-
den from defendants to plaintiff, the court denied the
motion.
VIII. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994508 ("GARA")
was enacted in part to address serious concerns about the enor-
mous product liability costs imposed by the tort system upon
manufacturers of general aviation aircraft. GARA imposes an
18-year statute of repose with respect to general aviation aircraft.
There was one opinion construing GARA in 2005.
A. 2005 CASES
1. Schwartz v. Hawkins & Powers Aviation, Inc.
Plaintiffs' decedents, employees of Hawkins & Powers Avia-
tion, Inc. ("Hawkins & Powers"), were killed in a plane crash
while conducting fire suppression under a contract to provide
5113 See id. at 882 n.6.
504 Holsinger v. Nickell, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10176, at *3 (D. Kan. May 16,
2005).
505 Id. at *1.
5 Id. at *2.
517 Id. at *4-5.
50- 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2005).
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services for the United States Forest Service.50 9 The aircraft was
manufactured in 1945 by the predecessor to General Dynamics
Corporation ("General Dynamics"), delivered to the United
States Navy, and later acquired by Hawkins & Powers in 1969.
Plaintiffs sued, inter alia, General Dynamics and Hawkins & Pow-
ers under various tort theories. 51° The defendants moved to dis-
miss plaintiffs' claims, and the U.S. District Court for the District
of Wyoming granted both motions. 11 General Dynamics ar-
gued that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the 18-year statute
of repose contained within GARA, while the plaintiffs argued
that the statute of repose did not apply. First, plaintiffs argued
that the aircraft was not a "general aviation aircraft" under
GARA, because it was a "public aircraft" as defined by the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 (the "Act").512 The court rejected that
argument, holding that the definitions under the Act have no
application to GARA, and that nothing in the definition of "gen-
eral aviation aircraft" in GARA prohibits public aircraft from be-
ing included.513 Second, the plaintiffs argued the aircraft was
not a "general aviation aircraft" because it had not been issued
an "airworthiness certificate," but rather a "special restricted air-
worthiness certificate." '5 14 Rejecting that argument, the court
held that GARA incorporates the description of airworthiness
certificate from the Act, and that the Act's definition does not
make a distinction between standard or restricted certificates. 515
Third, the plaintiffs argued that subsequent modifications to the
aircraft tolled the statute of repose.51 6 In response, the court
held that the statute is only tolled if the modification is alleged
to have proximately caused the injury, which was not alleged in
this case.51 Fourth, the court held that plaintiffs' arguments
about the application of the knowing misrepresentation and
warranty exceptions to GARA had no basis, because there was
no factual support for those exceptions to apply.518
509 Schwartz v. Hawkins & Powers Aviation, Inc., No. 04-CV-195-D, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12188, at *4-5 (D. Wyo. Apr. 7, 2005).
510 Id.
511 Id. at *6.
512 Id. at *9.
513 Id. at *10.
514 Id. at *11.
515 Id.
516 Id. at *12.
517 Id. at *13.
518 Id. at *17.
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With respect to defendant Hawkins & Powers, the plaintiffs
alleged a Bivens claim.'' Plaintiffs alleged that Hawkins & Pow-
ers acted under color of federal law by fighting forest fires on
federal lands and that it deprived the decedents of their lives
without due process of law by failing to maintain the firefighting
aircraft fleet due to coercion and encouragement by the federal
government.5 10 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, hold-
ing that they could not assert a Bivens claim against a private
entity under contract with the United States Government, rely-
ing upon the authority of Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko.5"2'
The court noted that it did not find it necessary to decide
whether a Bivens action was cognizable against an individual em-
ployed by Hawkins & Powers and addressed only whether a Biv-
ens claim was cognizable against the company.5
2
IX. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The "government contractor defense" limits state law tort lia-
bility against contractors for claims that arise out of procure-
ment contracts with the federal government. A contractor can
use this defense successfully if it meets the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 5'5 which al-
lows the defense when the following requirements are met: "(a)
the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(b) the equipment conformed to those specifications, and (c)
the supplier warned the United States about dangers in the use
of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States. ''15 4 The defense, however, is limited to design de-
fect cases in which it is shown that the government approved the
design feature in question and that the contractor complied
with the government's specifications.
- Id. at *18-19 ("[a] Bivens claim provides a tort remedy for an injured party
to sue a federal officer, or a person operating under color of federal authority,
who has violated the claimants' constitutional rights") (citing Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
'2 0I. at *19.
.,2 Id. at *21; see 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
522 Schwartz, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12188 at *23 n.2.
5211 Boyle N. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
524 Id. at 501.
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A. COLORABLE FEDERAL DEFENSE
1. Malsch v. Vertex Aerospace, LLC
In Malsch, a contractor successfully used the government con-
tractor defense in removing to federal court a case brought by
injured servicemen in Mississippi state court.5 25 The plaintiff
servicemen had been injured when their Marine Corps UH-1N
helicopter, manufactured by Bell Helicopters ("Bell"), crashed
after the aircraft lost its vertical stabilizer. 26 Plaintiffs filed suit
in state court in Mississippi, and Bell removed the action to fed-
eral court under 28 U.S.C Section 1442, which allows removal
when there is a colorable federal defense for acts performed
under the color of office. 527
After plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court,
the defendants argued that the government contractor defense
was applicable, since all the requirements of the Boyle test were
met.528 In support of this contention, the defendants produced
an affidavit from one of Bell's directors stating that the govern-
ment had controlled every step of the approval of the helicopter
and the design was specified or mandated by the contract with
the government. The plaintiffs argued that defendants had not
met the Boyle test, since the affidavit had not referenced the al-
legedly defectively designed components.529
The court found that the defendants had successfully shown
that they had a colorable federal defense with the government
contractor defense.
In the court's opinion, although Wilson's affidavit does not ex-
plicitly refer to any specific parts or components of the helicop-
ter which plaintiffs now claim were defectively designed and led
to the crash, the affidavit nevertheless fully supports a conclusion
that Bell has asserted a "colorable federal defense," and that the
requisite "causal nexus" exists between plaintiffs' claims as al-
leged in the complaint and acts Bell asserts it performed "under
color of federal office" in view of his declaration that the Govern-
ment "controlled the design of every aspect of the helicopter. "530
525 Malsch v. Vertex Aerospace, LLC, 361 F. Supp. 2d 583, 587 (S.D. Miss.
2005).
526 Id. at 584-85.
527 Id.
528 Id. at 586.
529 Id.
530 Id. at 587.
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In opposing the plaintiffs' motion to remand, the defendants
did not have to show the merits of the government contractor
defense. Rather, they only had to show a "colorable federal de-
fense" to keep the action in federal court.
X. WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention is an international private treaty
drafted in 1929 which, if applicable, governs the liability of air-
lines conducting international transportation of passengers and
cargo. In 1955, the Warsaw Convention was modified by the in-
ternational agreement referred to as the Hague Protocol, which
the United States chose not to ratify. However, on September
28, 1998, the United States ratified a later amending treaty, the
Montreal Protocol #4, which became effective as to the United
States on March 4, 1999. It is generally accepted by most courts
that by adopting the Montreal Protocol #4 the United States ac-
ceded to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the 1955
Hague Protocol. 3 ' Finally, on May 28, 1999, the Montreal Con-
vention 532 was created as a new international agreement to re-
place the Warsaw Convention. The Montreal Convention is not
an amendment to the Warsaw Convention but rather an entirely
new treaty that replaces the system of liability derived from War-
saw. The Montreal Convention took effect in the United States
on November 4, 2003.5s3
The Montreal Convention contains many of the same provi-
sions as the Warsaw Convention, but there are a few notable dif-
ferences.534  One critical distinction is that the Montreal
Convention added a "fifth jurisdiction," which provides that a
claimant asserting a claim for death or injury may bring suit in
the place of his or her domicile if the carrier provides service to
that State Party (country). A second critical distinction is that,
531 See Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1227 (S.D.
Cal. 2005). However, in Avero Belgium Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73 (2d
Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit found that "the United States did not consent to
be bound to the Hague Protocol (as a separate treaty) by virtue of its ratification
of Montreal Protocol No. 4. Indeed, it expressed an intention to the contrary."
Avero, 423 F.3d at 86.
532 The formal name for the Montreal Convention is The Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air Done at Montreal
on 28 May 1999.
533 Polanski, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
534 See Convention for International Carriage by Air, arts. 21, 33(2), 39-48 May
28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
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in the case of death or bodily injury, there is no limitation of
liability. The carrier is strictly liable for the first 100,000 Special
Drawing Rights ("SDRs"), but can dispute liability for amounts
in excess of 100,000 SDRs if it can show it was not negligent or
that the damages were solely due to the negligence- of a third
party. A third distinction is that Montreal apparently makes
both the "actual carrier" and the "contracting carrier" liable. In
other words, a claimant can sue either the carrier that operated
the flight or the carrier which issued the ticket. There were no
significant cases in 2005 specifically construing provisions of the
Montreal Convention, but there were several cases construing
the Warsaw Convention on issues which remain relevant under
the Montreal Convention and a few which would have had dif-
ferent results under Montreal.
A. CARRIER CODE-SHARING AGREEMENTS
1. Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc.
A New York district court held that a "code-sharing" agree-
ment between carriers did not make the non-operating carrier
liable for Warsaw Convention claims. 5 5 The plaintiff flew from
Minneapolis to Cincinnati on a Delta Air Lines, Inc. ("Delta")
flight, from Cincinnati to New York on a Delta flight, from New
York to Prague on a CSA Czech Airlines, Inc. ("CSA") flight, and
from Prague to Saint Petersburg, Russia, on another CSA flight.
During the New York to Prague leg, the plaintiff suffered trau-
matic brain injury, damaged and bulging disks in her spine, and
a fractured rib when the airplane encountered severe turbu-
lence. She sued Delta and CSA in district court alleging state
law claims of negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent mis-
representation, as well as Warsaw claims 6.5 " The court dismissed
all of the state law claims as preempted by the Warsaw Conven-
tion 7.5 3 Delta also moved to dismiss the plaintiff's Warsaw Con-
vention claims as they applied to Delta. Delta argued that it was
not the "carrier" at the time of the plaintiffs injuries and was
therefore not liable under the Warsaw Convention. Article
30(2) of the Warsaw Convention specifies that an injured party
may "take action only against the carrier who performed the car-
riage during which the accident or the delay ... occurred, save
535 Shirobokova v. CSA Czech Airlines, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 439, 439 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
536 Id. at 440-41.
537 Id. at 442.
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in the case where by express agreement, the first carrier has as-
sumed liability for the whole journey. '5353 The court reasoned
that although the term "carrier" is not specifically defined in the
Warsaw Convention, the term as used throughout the conven-
tion makes it clear that the drafters intended that it apply only
to the airline which actually transported the passenger. Further,
the plaintiff asserted in her complaint that she was on a "CSA
Czech Airlines Flight," and the complaint contained no allega-
tions suggesting that Delta was the carrier. 539 The court held
that Delta's participation in a code sharing agreement with CSA
did not make Delta the carrier. A code-sharing agreement is
merely "an arrangement whereby a carrier's designator code is
used to identify a flight operated by another carrier. ' '5 " The
court therefore dismissed the plaintiff's claims against Delta. In-
terestingly, the plaintiff's claims may have survived Delta's mo-
tion had the Montreal Convention applied; Articles 39 to 48 of
the Montreal Convention, which took effect in the United States
on November 4, 2003, provide that a passenger may sue both
the "contracting carrier" which issued the ticket and the "actual
carrier" which performed the transportation. 541 Here, if Delta
issued the ticket, it would have qualified as a contracting carrier
under Article 39 and would have been subject to liability. How-
ever, the court did not indicate whether Delta actually issued the
ticket, which makes determining what the outcome would have
been under the Montreal Convention difficult.
2. Orova v. Northwest Airlines
In Orova, a Pennsylvania district court held that a non-operat-
ing alliance partner was not liable under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 4 2 Plaintiff purchased an airline ticket from a Northwest
Airlines Inc. ("Northwest") ticket agent to fly on KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines ("KLM") from Newark, New Jersey, to Geneva,
Switzerland and then to Amsterdam. On the flight from Geneva
to Amsterdam, the plaintiff alleged she was accosted by the pilot
and temporarily prevented from exiting the plane when it ar-
rived in Amsterdam. -43 She claimed that this was done in retali-
538 Id. at 442 (quoting Article 30(2) of the Warsaw Convention).
539 Id. at 462.
541 Id. at 442.
,41 Montreal Convention, supra note 534, at arts. 39-48.
542 Orova v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 03-4296, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1822, at *34
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2005).
543 Id.
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ation for insisting that a flight attendant question the pilot
regarding an unidentified individual leaning over the pilot's
shoulder in the cockpit during the flight. 4 4 Then, on her re-
turn flight home leaving from Amsterdam, she claimed she was
once again humiliated by the flight attendant when she re-
quested an aisle seat due to health problems.545 The plaintiff
claimed the flight attendant yelled at her, told her not to touch
her, escorted her off the flight, and called security. 46 KLM se-
curity personnel then approached plaintiff and said that she
would not be flying with KLM.547
Plaintiff sued Northwest on the grounds that it was an "alli-
ance partner" with KLM, and Northwest moved to dismiss.54
The court granted the motion, holding that Northwest was not a
proper party and that plaintiff provided no evidence to pierce
the corporate veil between KLM and Northwest.549 The court
held that the term "carrier" used in Articles 17 and 19 of the
Warsaw Convention is not clearly defined, but it means the air-
line which "actually transports the passengers or baggage. 9550
This case would likely have been decided differently if the Mon-
treal Convention had applied, as Northwest clearly issued the
ticket and would have qualified as a "contracting carrier" pursu-
ant to Article 39 of the Montreal Convention.
B. CHOICE OF LAW
1. Medina v. American Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiff filed suit in federal court in Florida after sustaining
injuries when a cup of coffee spilled on his lap while onboard an
American Airlines, Inc. ("American") flight that originated in
Miami, Florida, bound for Cali, Colombia.55 1 Plaintiff alleged
that the flight attendant served him a cup of scalding coffee





548 Id. at *6.
549 Id.
550 Id. at *10 (quoting Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 845 F.2d 1100, 1103
(D.C. Cir. 1998)).
551 Medina v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-022133, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18916,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2005).
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ach and groin area, leaving permanent scarring. Plaintiff sued
American pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.552
American filed a motion seeking to have the court determine
that Colombian law governed the measure of damages.
553
American relied upon certain agreements promulgated by the
International Air Transport Association and the Air Transport
Association. The court held that, although documents promul-
gated by those associations had domicile provisions, the provi-
sions did not dictate that Colombian law should apply.
554
Instead, the court applied a choice of law analysis under Florida
law, as the case was filed in Florida. The court noted that Flor-
ida has adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), which dictates
weighing a list of relevant factors.5 5 Considering those factors,
the court held that Florida law, not Colombian law, should apply
to the issue of damages.556 The court relied principally on the
portion of the most significant relationship test requiring the
court to apply the law of the state that would best achieve the
basic policy underlying the law involved.557 Because the court
found that Colombian law appeared stricter than Florida law on
the issue of compensatory damages, it held that the application
of Colombian law would frustrate the goal of compensation and
deterrence by limiting the amount the tortfeasor must pay to
compensate the victim.
5 s
C. DEFINITION OF "ACCIDENT"
1. Ramos v. Transmeridian Airlines
The plaintiff in Ramos boarded Air Santo Domingo Flight 803
in Puerto Rico to fly to the Dominican Republic.559 A f ter the
passengers were seated, a flight attendant asked the passenger
occupying the window seat in plaintiff's row if he would be will-
ing to change seats with another passenger.56 The passenger
occupying the window seat agreed and crossed in front of plain-
552 Id. at *2.
553 Id.
5-5- Id. at *15.
5-5 Id. at *17.
56 Id. at *26.
557 Id. at *20.
5-5s Id. at *26.
55 1 Ramos v. Transmeridian Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 137, 139 (D.P.R.
2005).
560 Id. at 137.
20061
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tiff to exit the row.561 While doing so, he lost his balance and
fell on the plaintiff, fracturing her arm in two places. 562 The
plaintiff filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico,
and defendant Transmeridian Airlines, Inc. ("Transmeridian")
removed the action to federal court.563 Transmeridian moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs com-
mon law claims did not satisfy the requirements of the Warsaw
Convention.564
The court agreed, holding that the plaintiff did not suffer an
accident as defined by Article 17 of Warsaw Convention. 56 5 Cit-
ing Air France v. Saks,5 66 the court stated that an "accident" is
defined as an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that
is external to the passenger. ' 567 In order for the event to qualify
as an accident, the plaintiff must prove both that an unusual or
unexpected event external to the plaintiff occurred and that the
event was a malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's opera-
tion.56 8 The court held that the first prong of the test was satis-
fied, because a reasonable passenger would not expect a fellow
passenger to fall on top of him.56 9 However, the second part of
the test was not satisfied, because the event did not fall within
the "operation of the aircraft", i.e., it was not within the airline's
purview or control.570 The court relied upon the precedent of
Gotz v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,571 a case in which a plaintiff was in-
jured while attempting to put a heavy bag in the overhead com-
partment. Even though the airline had specifically ordered the
plaintiff to place the bag in the overhead compartment, that
court found there was no evidence that the incident was in the
airline's purview or control.5 72 Following that rationale, the Ra-
mos court reasoned that the passenger stepping over the plaintiff
had no relation to the operation of the aircraft and did not re-






566 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
567 Ramos, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 406).
568 Id.
569 Id.
570 Id. at 142.
571 Gotz v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 200 (D. Mass. 1998).
572 Id. at 204.
573 Ramos, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
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The court further held that plaintiff's claims for emotional
injuries were barred as not recoverable under the Warsaw Con-
vention and that the plaintiff's Commonwealth claims tinder the
law of Puerto Rico were barred pursuant to the Warsaw Conven-
tion's clear preemptive effect.574
D. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION-SINGLE OPERATION
1. Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Robertson, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion, holding that a Denver to Chicago flight qualified as inter-
national transportation under the Warsaw Convention. 7 The
plaintiff booked a roundtrip flight between Washington, D.C.,
and Denver on American Airlines ("American") and then
booked a roundtrip flight from Denver to London on British
Airways ("BA"). The plaintiffs plan was to fly from Washington
to Denver on American and then from Denver to London on
BA with her return trip following the same path. On the return
trip, the plaintiff flew BA from London to Denver. After a three-
hour layover in Denver, she boarded an American flight to
Washington via Chicago. On that leg of the journey, she was
injured after she asked a flight attendant to cool a "gel pack" she
was using to treat a sore back. The attendant cooled the pack
with dry ice, as opposed to ordinary ice; as a result, the plaintiff
suffered third degree thermal burns when she applied the gel
pack to her skin. 76
Plaintiff sued American in superior court in the District of Co-
lumbia, and American removed the action to federal court.
American then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that the two year statute of limitations of the Warsaw Conven-
tion barred the claim (the action was filed almost three years
after the accident). The plaintiff argued Washington, D.C.'s
three-year statute of limitation applied.5 7
The issue was whether the plaintiffs flight constituted an in-
ternational flight so as to invoke Warsaw's two year limitations
statute. 57 8 Article 1(3) of the Warsaw Convention, which defines
international transportation, provides the following:
574 Id. at 143.
575 Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
576 Id. at 500-01.
577 Id. at 501.
578 See id.
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Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers
shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one
undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as
a single operation, whether it has been agreed upon under the
form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall
not lose its international character merely because one contract
or series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory
subject to the sovereignty . . . of the same High Contracting
Party.
579
Focusing on the phrase "regarded by the parties as a single
operation," the court held that the parties regarded the trip as a
single operation. Because of the impossibility of knowing the
subjective knowledge of the parties, the court applied an objec-
tive test to determine the parties' intent.580 The court found it
significant that the plaintiffs layover in Denver was only for the
purpose of making the plane connection home. The court also
found that American knew the trip was international, because it
is charged with the knowledge of the travel agency who sold the
ticket on its behalf. The court held that the plaintiff's argument
that she performed different work in Denver than in London
and that two different airlines were involved was irrelevant.
81
Accordingly, the circuit court affirmed the district court's ruling
and barred plaintiff's claims.
2. Auster v. Ghana Airways
In June 2000, Airlink Flight 200 crashed during the landing
approach on a flight between Tamale, Ghana and Accra,
Ghana.582 The plaintiffs, some of the surviving passengers and
the estates of some decedents, sued Airlink and Ghana Airways
pursuant to the Warsaw Convention in federal district court.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
because Airlink Flight 200 was a domestic flight, the Warsaw
Convention did not apply.58 3 In response, plaintiffs alleged that
the flight within Ghana was part of an international journey with
a connecting flight to the United States making that portion an
international flight.584
579 Id. at 502
580 Id.
581 Id. at 502-03.
582 Auster v. Ghana Airways, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35419, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept.
21, 2005).
583 Id. at *34.
584 Id.
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The court, citing Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention, deter-
mined that plaintiffs could prevail only if Flight 200 was part of
"one undivided transportation" between Tamale, Ghana and the
United States.585 Plaintiffs argued that the Airlink flight be-
tween Tamale and Accra was part of their international travel,
because they had tickets booked on Ghana Airways to continue
from Accra to the United States and because they told the Air-
link ticket agent of their intent to travel internationally. 586 In
response to defendants' argument that the tickets for Flight 200
were purchased on different dates than the international tickets,
plaintiffs noted that they were unable to purchase Airlink tickets
in the United States, even though they intended to make this
flight as part of their overall itinerary.587
While acknowledging the recent decision of the D.C. Circuit
Court in Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc. 588 which appeared
helpful to plaintiffs' case, the court distinguished the facts of
Robertson and granted the defendants' motion. While the Robert-
son court found the knowledge by Robertson's travel agent, who
booked both the international and domestic segments, was im-
puted to the airline, the court did not make such an imputation
here.5 9 Although plaintiffs claimed that they informed the Air-
link agent about their intentions to travel on international
flights, the Airlink tickets were stamped as domestic and were
purchased from a different agent than the tickets purchased in
the United States. The court characterized the flights between
Accra and Tamale as a "domestic side trip. ' 590 The court found
that there was "simply no objective documentary evidence to
support a conclusion that the parties intended plaintiffs' domes-
tic flight from Tamale to Accra to constitute a portion of plain-
tiffs' international journey. 591
E. PREEMPTION
1. Adegbuji v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
In Adegbuji, a New Jersey federal district court held that plain-
tiffs claims for state law negligence and assault were preempted
585 Id. at *6.
586 id. at *7.
587 Id. at *8.
581s Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
5s1 Auster, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35419, at *14-15.
5,90 Id. at *13.
59 Id. at *15.
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by the Warsaw Convention.592 The plaintiff was ordered to be
removed from the United States by the United States Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 593 In connection with
that removal, Continental Airlines' ("Continental") employees
attempted to board him on a Continental flight from Newark
Liberty International Airport to London. 594 The plaintiff re-
sisted being escorted onto the plane and suffered minor injuries
after crew members accompanied him to his seat.595 Plaintiff
filed numerous claims against Continental, most of which were
dismissed by a previous order, including his claim for Warsaw
damages. In that previous order, the court held that his injuries
did not arise from an "accident" as defined by Warsaw.596
This opinion involved Continental's motion for summary
judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiffs common law negligence
and assault claims and to enforce the limitation of liability for
plaintiff's lost luggage claims under Warsaw.597 The court held
that the plaintiff's common law negligence and assault claims
were preempted by the Warsaw Convention.59a Article 24 of the
Convention, as amended by Montreal Protocol No. 4, provides
that: "in the carriage of passengers and baggage, any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this Convention, without
prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have
the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. 59 9
The treaty thus "precludes passengers from bringing actions
under local law when they cannot establish air carrier liability
under the treaty."60 0 The court also held that the plaintiffs
claim for lost luggage was limited by Warsaw to $640 per bag.6 '
2. Elnajjar v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Less than four months after September 11, 2001, plaintiffs
Elnajjar andJaoude claimed that they were treated rudely at the
592 Adegbuji v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. 04-CV-1916, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26716, at *9 (D.NJ. Nov. 4, 2005).




597 Id. at *3.
598 Id. at *9.
599 Id. at *6 (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Inc. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175
(1999)).
600 Id. at *9 (quoting Tseng, 525 U.S. at 159).
601 Id. at *10.
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gate and onboard defendants' flight between Houston and Am-
sterdam.""' Plaintiffs claimed that they were screamed at by the
gate agent and were told that they would be seated next to a
Federal Marshal on the airplane."" Prior to takeoff, plaintiffs
were escorted off the aircraft by United States Secret Service
Agents and an armed soldier and were not allowed to reboard
the aircraft.'"" Plaintiffs were routed through different cities
and ultimately missed spending the Christmas holidays with
their families."" Plaintiffs sued the airlines in federal district
court for negligence, breach of contract, false imprisonment, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,
defamation, and violations of several federal statutes. Defend-
ants moved to dismiss and argued that the claims were either
preempted by the Warsaw Convention or the Federal Aviation
Act as amended by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA") or, if
not preempted, that the plaintiffs' claims failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted."6 "
The court divided plaintiffs' claims into two categories, those
injuries that occurred onboard and during disembarkation and
those that occurred after disembarking the aircraft. The court
found that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention preempted
plaintiffs' state law claims for negligence and conspiracy, which
arose out of incidents onboard the airplane and while dis-
embarking. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the claims were barred
under Article 17, since they only alleged emotional and mental
harm and not physical injuries. As to the injuries that arose af-
ter disembarking, the court found that the Warsaw Convention
did not preempt plaintiffs' claims.10 7 However, all but one of
these state law claims were nevertheless preempted by the ADA,
because the court found that the claims related to the service
provided by defendants. The only one of the plaintiffs' state law
claims to survive preemption, the claim for false imprisonment,
was also dismissed, because plaintiffs' allegations were insuffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of a false imprisonment claim.
602 Elnajjar v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36792, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 15, 2005).
603 Id. at *3.
604 1i. at *4.
605 1d.
"o" Id. at *2-7.
607 Id. at *12.
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The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' federal statutory claims
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 608
F. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION/VENUE
1. Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Plaintiff purchased a ticket in California for a KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines ("KLM") flight from Los Angeles to Warsaw, Po-
land with a layover in Amsterdam." 9 The ticket was issued by
Northwest Airlines Inc. ("Northwest") on behalf of KLM. 610 Fif-
teen minutes after takeoff, the plaintiff began to experience ex-
cruciating stomach pain."' He claimed that he was forced to
remain for the entire flight lying down in a baggage compart-
ment area, where he was administered an injectable pain medi-
cation.612 After suffering severe pain during the entire twelve
hour flight to Amsterdam, he was taken by ambulance to a hos-
pital, where he was diagnosed with a perforated duodenal ul-
cer.613 He underwent surgery, which he alleged was necessary
only because of complications arising from the delay in treat-
ment.614 Plaintiff claimed the plane should have landed in the
continental United States so that he could have received timely
medical treatment.
Plaintiff brought suit against KLM in federal court in Califor-
nia, and KLM moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.615 KLM argued that the plaintiffs claims
were governed by the Warsaw Convention, that the Warsaw Con-
vention established four places where an action may be brought,
and that the United States was not one of the four places author-
ized by the Warsaw Convention under the facts of the case.616
The court agreed that the Warsaw Convention governed the
claims, because the plaintiffs ulcer was an "accident" under Ar-
ticle 17 of the Warsaw Convention.617 The court held that the
-8 Id. at *20.
609 Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224 (S.D. Cal.
2005).
610 Id.






617 The court held that the Montreal Convention did not apply as alleged by
the plaintiff because it did not enter into force until November 4, 2003, and the
accident happened on October 30, 2003.
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"unusual or unexpected event" was the unreasonable delay by
the airlines before the plaintiff received necessary medical care.
Also, the court held that the Warsaw Convention would apply to
the extent the plaintiff made a claim for an intentional tort
under Article 25. Because the Warsaw Convention applied, the
court dismissed all of the plaintiffs state law claims against
KLM. 6 18
In addressing the subject matter jurisdiction argument, the
court noted that the Warsaw Convention allows four places
where a plaintiff may bring suit: the domicile of the carrier, the
carrier's principal place of business, the carrier's place of busi-
ness through which the contract has been made, or the place of
destination." The court held that California was the place
through which the contract was made by the carrier, and, there-
fore, the third prong of the test was satisfied.62 The court re-
jected KLM's argument that Northwest Airlines rather than
KLM issued the ticket.62' The court found that, as an alliance
partner with Northwest, KLM essentially has a place of business
in the United States through which it makes contracts. 62 2 Be-
cause a contract is made in the place where the last act was done
that was essential to the meeting of the minds of the parties, the
court found that the contract was made within the United States
and that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. 62' This analy-
sis would have been unnecessary had the Montreal Convention
applied, as jurisdiction in the domicile of the plaintiff is ex-
pressly provided for if the carrier provides service to the State
Party (country) where the plaintiff resides.6 4 Further, had the
Montreal Convention applied, the plaintiff could have also sued
Northwest as a "contracting carrier" under Article 39.
G. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
1. Simo-Noboa v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana
In Simo-Noboa, plaintiffs mother died in the Dominican Re-
public and plaintiff sent her body to Puerto Rico for cremation,
with the ashes to be returned to the Dominican Republic for
618 Id. at 1231.
619 Id. at 1228.
6211 Id. at 1231.
621 Id. at 1229.
622 Id. at 1230.
623 Id. at 1231.
624 See Montreal Convention, supra note 534, at art. 33(2).
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burial.625 After the body was cremated, the ashes were placed in
a small box labeled "Fragile" and loaded for the return trip. On
the return trip, the ashes were lost and have never been
found.6 26 The plaintiff sued the defendant airline under the
Warsaw Convention, alleging willful misconduct for failing to es-
tablish a procedure for transportation of human ashes and for
failing to follow even its own procedures for the transfer of
human remains.627 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed the airline
failed to place a "HUM" code (for human remains) on the box
of ashes, which would have alerted airline personnel to take ex-
tra precautions with the package.628
The issue was whether the plaintiff stated a valid claim for
"willful misconduct" under the Warsaw Convention so that the
limitation of liability found in Article 25 would not apply. The
court held the term "willful misconduct" encompasses two com-
ponents, the "intellectual" aspect, whereby a person is aware
that a particular course of conduct is unsound, and the "voli-
tional" element whereby the person decides to follow that par-
ticular course of conduct.6 29 The court held the defendant's
failure to include the "HUM" label on the cargo did not consti-
tute either a conscious awareness of its detrimental conse-
quences or a deliberate intention to cause damage.
Therefore, the court held the plaintiff was subject to the liability
limitation of Article 25 of Warsaw, limiting the plaintiffs dam-
ages to $736.00 in accordance with Article 22.631
XI. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
A. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
1. Isla Nena Air Services, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
In Isla Nena, an airline sued the aircraft and engine manufac-
turers after one of its aircraft was forced to make a water landing
off the coast of Puerto Rico after an engine failure.632 As a re-
sult of the engine failure, the engine was completely destroyed,
625 Sirno Noboa v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 383 F. Supp. 2d 323, 324
(D.P.R. 2005).
626 Id.
627 Id. at 325.
628 Id.
629 Id.
630 Id. at 326.
631 Id. at 327.




and the aircraft suffered major damage.'" The airline sued in
federal court in Puerto Rico under the theories of negligence
and strict liability to recover economic losses from the loss of the
aircraft, repair to the aircraft, loss of business income, and other
damages, and sought indemnification for claims brought by the
passengers.' 4 Defendants moved to dismiss the first four counts
of the complaint, which addressed the airline's economic losses
arising from the crash, alleging that admiralty law applied,
under which the "economic loss rule" would bar recovery for
damage to the aircraft except under warranty claims. In the
alternative, defendants argued that if the court followed Puerto
Rican law, the economic loss rule would still be applicable and
would bar plaintiffs claims.""i6
The court agreed with defendants and granted their motion
to dismiss Counts I through IV.' The court applied the two-
part test from Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,"'8
which determines whether admiralty law applies to the crash of
a land-based aircraft. The test requires the following: "[F]irst,
the situs of the crash had to be within navigable waters; and sec-
ond, there had to be some nexus between the type of activity
involved and traditional maritime activity. '""" Later Supreme
Court decisions attempted to define the second prong of the
test to determine "traditional maritime activity" and raised the
following two additional issues under this prong: "(1) whether
the incident has a 'potentially disruptive impact on maritime
commerce' (viewing the 'general features of the type of incident
involved'); and (2) whether the 'general character' of the 'activ-
ity giving rise to the incident' bears a 'substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity.""4' As to the first prong of the
test, the court found that, because the crash occurred in the
waters surrounding Puerto Rico, it had occurred in "navigable
waters" for the purpose of determining admiralty jurisdiction. '
The court also found that the second prong was met since "the
Supreme Court has made clear that the test is a broad one and
6"" Id. at 76.
34 Id. at 75.
635 Id. at 75-76.
636 Id. at 76.
(37 Id.
63 8 Executive jet Aviation, Inc., v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
639 Isla Nena, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
I Id. (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-365 (1990)).
641 Id. at 77.
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concerns 'potential impact' and not actual impact on maritime
commerce."64 2 The court rejected plaintiffs arguments that
both the manufacturing of aircraft and the defective component
had to be related to maritime activity due to the broad nature of
the test and found admiralty jurisdiction, which triggered the
application of the economic loss rule.643 Because Counts I
through IV of plaintiffs complaint sought damages for damage
or loss to the aircraft and did not seek recovery for damage to
other property or for personal injuries, the court found that the
economic loss rule applied and barred recovery by plaintiff
under those four counts.644 Plaintiffs claim for its losses would
have to be alleged as a warranty claim rather than as a tort ac-
tion.645 In the alternative, the court found that the same result
would occur under Puerto Rican law, since the economic loss
rule would still bar plaintiffs recovery. 646
B. DRAM SHOP ACTS
1. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend
The plaintiff sued Delta Air Lines, Inc. ("Delta") after he was
injured in an automobile accident in which the other driver,
William Serio, had been served alcohol by Delta prior to the
crash.647 The plaintiff sued Delta in Georgia state court under
the Georgia Dram Shop Act648 ("GDSA") and for common law
negligence. After the trial court granted Delta's motion to dis-
642 Id. at 78.
643 The court defined the economic loss rule as follows:
The "economic loss rule" is a products liability concept that pre-
cludes tort claims, whether stated in negligence or strict liability,
for damages the alleged defective product causes to the product
itself resulting in purely economic losses under the rationale that
such claims are properly brought as a warranty claim rather than in
tort. Only where the alleged defective product causes damage to
other property (other than the defective product itself) or personal
injuries, does the economic loss rule not apply. In those exceptions,
the plaintiff is entitled to recover in tort only those damages to the
other property or for personal injuries sustained as a result, but not
the economic losses associated with the alleged defective product.
Id. at 81.
644 Id.
645 Id. at 82.
646 Id.
647 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 614 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. 2005).
648 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40 (West 2005).
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miss, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the decision as to
the GDSA claim.649
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, determining that
the intent of the GDSA was to target land-based establishments,
such as restaurants or bars, where the "patrons of land-based
establishments serving alcohol generally have direct and imme-
diate access to their vehicles...."... With respect to an airline,
the passengers to whom the flight attendants serve alcohol do
not have such direct and immediate access to motor vehicles.6 51
In addition, the airline would not have knowledge of whether
the passenger would be continuing to travel by another flight or
by car.6 52 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to
state a claim against Delta under the GDSA.6 53 Because there
was no claim, the court did not address Delta's preemption ar-
gument under federal law.654
C. FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE
1. Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Services
In Britton, plaintiffs sued in California state court for injuries
arising out of a helicopter crash." 5' The plaintiffs alleged that
defendants were liable due to negligence, product liability, and
breach of warranty.656 After the defendants' motion to dismiss
on forum non conveniens grounds was denied, defendants re-
moved the case to federal court after which plaintiffs filed a mo-
tion to remand.6 57
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California first determined that it lacked subject matterjurisdic-
tion over the case due to lack of diversity between the parties
and because there was no federal question involved. Defend-
ants had argued that there was federal question jurisdiction
since the "Transportation Laws of the United States and the reg-
ulations promulgated by the FAA [Federal Aviation Administra-
649 Townsend, 614 S.E.2d at 747.
65o Id. at 748-49.




655 Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Servs., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13259, at *2
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tion] pursuant to those laws preempt state law in these areas. 658
The court agreed with other decisions that found no preemp-
tion by the federal government in the field of aviation safety.
659
The court also found that removal was not warranted under
the Federal Officer Removal Statute, which provides an absolute
right of removal in certain actions against officers of the United
States.66 The defendants relied on the Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion in Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors,a61 which held that
the Federal Officer Removal Statute applied to private individu-
als who repaired aircraft according to the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration ("FAA") specifications.6 62 The court declined to
follow Magnin, because the plaintiffs here had not named any
individuals who had performed maintenance on the helicopter
and had not alleged that the FAA's issuance of an airworthiness
certificate contributed to the crash.66 The court also noted that
658 Id. at *7 (quoting defendants' motion opposing plaintiffs' motion to
remand).
659 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Duncan v. Nw.
Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); Vinnick v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 93
Cal. App. 4th 859 (2001).
66o 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 provides:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State
court against any of the following may be removed by them to the
district court of the United States for the district and division em-
bracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or
any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of
any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for
any act under color of such office or on account of any right,
title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the
apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of
the revenue.
(2) A property holder whose title is derived from any such of-
ficer, where such action or prosecution affects the validity of
any law of the United States.
(3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for any Act
under color of office or in the performance of his duties;
(4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for any act in the
discharge of his official duty under an order of such House.
661 Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1996).
662 See id. at 1429.
663 The court stated in a footnote that it
: * , decline [d] to read Magnin so broadly as to consider all underly-
ing conduct involved in airplane engine repair and maintenance in
determining whether a defendant may raise a colorable federal of-
ficer defense. Assuming that every repair or maintenance inspec-
tion on an airplane engine is eventually followed by issuance of a
certificate of airworthiness, then every airplane engine repair and
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the defendants' removal of the case was untimely, as it had been
filed more than thirty days after the complaint had been
served. 6'4
D. NON-OPERATOR OWNER/LESSOR LIABILITY
1. Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc.
In Coleman, the plaintiff sued for wrongful death after the
crash of a Piper aircraft with a Cessna aircraft owned by defen-
dant Windham Aviation, Inc. ("Windham") and leased by defen-
dant Brooks Kay ("Kay").'" The plaintiff moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of Windham's vicarious liability
for Kay's actions, but Windham argued that the plaintiffs state
law vicarious liability claims were preempted by 49 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 44112."6
Initially, the text of 49 U.S.C. Section 44112 appeared to sup-
port Windham's argument.117 However, the court looked to the
predecessor statute, 49 U.S.C. Section 1404, to determine the
Congressional intent of the new statute."' The court deter-
mined that the recodification of Section 1404 substantially al-
maintenance mechanic could remove to federal court even the sim-
plest of negligence claims. Such a result seems questionable, and
the Court does not reach it.
Britton, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13259 at *13 n.3.
664 1(. at *16.
665 Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc., No. K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 119, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 18, 2005).
666 Id.
667 The text of 49 U.S.C.A. § 44112 reads:
(a) Definitions. In this section -
(1) "lessor" means a person leasing for at least 30 days a civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller.
(2) "owner" means a person that owns a civil aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller.
(3) "secured party" means a person having a security interest
in, or security title to, a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propel-
ler under a conditional sales contract, equipment trust con-
tract, chattel or corporate mortgage, or similar instrument.
(b) Liability. A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal
injury, death, or property loss or damage on land or water only
when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual
possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the
personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because
of -
(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine,
or propeller.
"" Coleman, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 119 at *16.
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tered the original statute by exempting all owners and lessors,
instead of limiting the exemption for security purposes.669 The
court found that
[t]he recodification impermissibly extends the scope of the ex-
emption well beyond the confines of the predecessor statute. Be-
cause the Court is bound by the intent of the predecessor statute,
the Court finds that Section 44112 does not provide an exemp-
tion for Defendant Windham as they outright owned the Piper
involved in the fatal collision.6 70
The court then engaged in a choice of law discussion to deter-
mine whether Rhode Island or Connecticut's vicarious liability
laws would apply.671 Ultimately, because the law of either state
would produce the same result, the court granted plaintiffs par-
tial motion for summary judgment as to Windham's vicarious
liability.672
E. PROXIMATE CAUSE
1. Janis v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.
In 2002, a Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. ("Pratt & Whitney")
engine failed during a flight piloted by Thomas Janis ("Janis")
over Colombian airspace.673 Although Janis and his passenger,
Luis Alcides Cruz ("Cruz"), survived the crash, they were killed
by members of a Colombian rebel group.674 Janis' estate sued
Pratt & Whitney in Florida federal district court for negligence
and strict liability for the resulting deaths, and Pratt & Whitney
moved for summary judgment.675 Pratt & Whitney's main con-
tention was that it did not owe a duty to the decedents and that,
even if a duty was owed, the breach of that duty did not proxi-
mately cause the deaths. 676
The court found that under Florida law, Pratt & Whitney, as
an engine manufacturer, owed a duty of care to decedents. Spe-
cifically, it owed them the "duty of care to prevent the general
harm of injury and death occurring at the site of an unplanned
669 Id.
670 Id.
671 See id. at *12.
672 Id. at *19-20.







landing allegedly caused by a defective engine. ' 77 As to proxi-
mate cause, because plaintiffs presented evidence that Pratt &
Whitney had knowledge of the presence of hostile forces in Co-
lombia and knew that Janis would be flying missions over Co-
lombia utilizing their engine, there remained an issue of fact
whether the injuries received byJanis and Cruz were foreseeable
by Pratt & Whitney.6 78 Therefore, the court denied Pratt &
Whitney's motion for summary judgment.6 79
F. SEPTEMBER 11TH LIABILITY INSURANCE
1. In re September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases
(February 23, 2005)
In this action, the lessees of One and Two World Trade
Center moved the court for leave to schedule additional deposi-
tions.68 The lessees had brought third-party actions against
their insurers seeking both a defense and indemnification for
their losses. In denying the motion, Judge Hellerstein revisited
his reasoning for limiting discovery concerning the insurance
binders to ten depositions per side.6 8 The magnitude of discov-
ery requested by the lessees "would take years to accomplish,
wasting valuable resources of insurance monies, needlessly de-
laying and frustrating the recoveries sought by plaintiffs, the
prospect of reasonable and early settlements, and uselessly en-
riching counsel." '682 Therefore, the parties were limited to the
initial scope of discovery set forth in earlier orders, with addi-
tional discovery permitted by a showing of good cause. Judge
Hellerstein also set out a schedule which, among other things,
set deadlines for the insurers, both primary and excess, to iden-
tify witnesses and to show the court good cause for allowing ad-
ditional depositions.
677 Id. at 1231.
678 Id. at 1232.
679 Id.
6, In re Sept. 11 th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, No. 03-CIV-0332, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2600, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2005).
61 The issue of insurance coverage for the lessees arose from the insurance
binders, not insurance policies, since the policies had not been issued as of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Id. at *5-6.
682 Id. at *8-9.
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2. In re September 1 1th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases
(March 1, 2005)
The decision issued on March 1, 2005, addressed questions
arising out of Judge Hellerstein's order of February 23, 2005.683
This opinion concerned a letter sent by United States Fire Insur-
ance Company ("U.S. Fire") requesting clarification of the Feb-
ruary 23, 2005 order.68 4 U.S. Fire, as an excess insurer, had
deferred discovery and requested that the insureds identify wit-
nesses and produce documents in order for the excess insurers
to be able to determine whether additional depositions were re-
quired.68 5 Judge Hellerstein's decision indicated frustration
with the excess insurers due to their delay in complying with the
discovery schedules, since he had earlier denied the excess in-
surers' applications to defer their discovery.686 U.S. Fire's re-
quests were denied.687
3. In re September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases
(March 8, 2005)
In a second decision issued by Judge Hellerstein in March
2005, he addressed a cross-motion by Certain Underwriters of
Lloyds, London ("Certain Underwriters"), both an excess and
primary insurer for the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey."' The motion by Certain Underwriters requested leave
of the court to conduct additional depositions. Judge Heller-
stein denied the motion, commenting that "Certain Underwrit-
ers [sic] decision to wait on the sidelines to see how the so-called
'main issues' played out reflected their strategy, but not my or-
ders."6 9 As with the other parties, the court held that, if Certain
Underwriters sought discovery, they would have to show good
cause. 690
683 In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, No. 03-CIV-0332, 2005 U.S. Dist.




687 Id. at *11.
688 In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, No. 03-CV-0332, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3452, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2005).
-9 Id. at *5.
690 Id. at *6.
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